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Abstract 
 
 
The Second Machine Age has catalyzed a surge in digitization, new ways of acquiring 
knowledge and higher rates of innovation; artificial intelligence is identified as the most 
important general purpose technology of this era, reframing traditional sources of competitive 
advantage and shifting the roles of people in the workforce. Organizations worldwide are facing 
incredible pressure to adapt and transform technologically; however, there are significant gaps 
with respect to organizations’ interest to adopt AI and their ability to do so. National cultures 
vary and this variation among national cultural values may predispose organizations operating in 
specific nations to be more equipped to adapt to technological change, specifically to adopt AI 
technology. This thesis investigates whether variation across national cultures influences 
organizational adoption of AI. The study provides a qualitative analysis of existing literature 
including organizational innovation, technological adoption, and organizational culture, as well 
as an analytical case study, comparing a French and an American multinational 
telecommunications organization to evaluate the influence of national sociocultural values on 
organizational adoption of AI.  
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Chapter 1: Artificial Intelligence in the Context of Organizational Adoption 
 
Section I: The Purpose of this Research 
The Goal 
I wanted to offer insight on whether organizations operating in different nations within 
the same industry adopt AI at different rates or through different processes. The various 
methodological approaches that I used in my research do have limitations and relied on certain 
assumptions. For this reason, I am not able to make a definitive claim about the relative rates of 
organizational adoption of AI of organizations in the U.S. and France; however, my research did 
illuminate why such a study merits further research, as well as additional approaches that could 
be taken in the future to quantify organizational rate of adoption and measure the influence of the 
sociocultural values of employees on organizational adoption of AI. In addition, my research 
stemmed from a curiosity about the relationship between organizational adoption of technology 
(which is widely recognized as a competitive necessity) and different individual-level 
sociocultural values. Resulting from this intrinsic curiosity, I was eager to attempt to offer a 
prescriptive claim about the capacity of organizations operating in different countries to adopt a 
technology that is currently viewed as “the most transformative technology for organizations” 
(The Economist).  
The Motivation 
My motivating interest for my thesis was the variation of sociocultural values of 
individuals and its influence on organizational adoption of technology; however, as a result of 
methodological limitations, I my thesis investigates the variation across national cultural values 
2	
	
and evaluates the influence of national cultural variation on organizational adoption of AI. I 
identified AI as an optimal type of technology to study how variation of national cultural values 
influence organizational adoption of technology because organizational adoption of AI is 
identified as a “competitive necessity” for organizations, indicating that organizations worldwide 
are incentivized to adopt AI. Next, I selected France and the U.S. as two nations that would 
enable a comparison of the influence of varying national cultural values on organizational 
adoption of AI, as these nations have cultures that are historically distinct and embody separate 
values (Hofstede); in this way, comparatively analyzing a French firm’s AI adoption process 
with that of an American firm enabled me to analyze whether cultural values played a role on 
organizational adoption of AI. I chose to analyze two firms in the telecommunications industry 
because this industry was identified as the industry that has adopted AI most rapidly.1 
Why now? And Why Artificial Intelligence (AI)? 
There is a commonly held perception that the second machine age2 is “unfolding right 
now”; this age is identified as an “inflection point in the history of our economies and societies 
                                                
1 At the Economics of AI conference in 2017, a portion of the conference was dedicated to 
discussing the influence of AI on competition, and market structure. Hal Varian and Carl Shapiro 
presented a presentation titled Machine Learning, Market Structure, and Competition and cited a 
McKinsey report. The McKinsey & Company report indicated that the telecommunications 
industry was the industry that had adopted the most AI-related technologies at scale or in a core 
part of the business compared to organizations in other industries. The relevant table can be 
found on slide eleven of Machine Learning, Market Structure, and Competition by Carl Shapiro 
and Hal Varian. 
2 McAfee and Brynjolfsson characterize the Industrial Revolution as the first machine age. The 
authors note that the Industrial Revolution ushered in humanity’s first machine age and this era 
was, “the first time [our world’s] progress was driven primarily by technological innovation—
and it was the most profound time of transformation our world has ever seen (5). “The machine 
age” is also a label used by some economic historians to refer to a period of rapid technological 
progress spanning the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Others refer to this period as 
the Second Industrial Revolution.  
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because of digitization.”3 The surge in digitization has resulted in two main consequences: new 
ways of acquiring knowledge and higher rates of innovation. There is widespread agreement that 
this age is occurring and that it is an “inflection point” for human progress; observations about 
the implications of “second machine age” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 9). How exactly this 
transformational period will “play out remains unknown, but if this new machine age bends the 
curve as dramatically as Watt’s steam engine, “it is a very big deal” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 
10).  The “outstanding features” of this age include: “sustained exponential improvement in 
many aspects of computing, extraordinarily large amounts of digitized information, and 
recombinant innovation” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 12). These three advances are propelling 
our society in new ways, enabling impressive breakthroughs that “convert science fiction into 
everyday reality” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, Chapter 4, 34). In addition, it is widely 
acknowledged that there is “no end in sight” for these breakthroughs. The reasoning behind this 
statement is that exponential, digital and recombinant powers of the second machine age have 
made it possible for humanity to “create two of the most important one-time events in our 
history: the emergence of real, useful artificial intelligence (AI) and the connection of most of 
the people on the planet via a common digital network” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson). This is the 
first driver for my research: to investigate this transformative age more closely, specifically in 
the context of one of the most significant technological advances (AI), to better understand this 
age, this technology, and the effects of this period. That is why I am conducting my research 
“now” and focusing on artificial intelligence.  
                                                
3 In Information Rules by economists Hal Varian and Carl Shapiro, digitization is defined as 
“encoding information as a stream of bits” or “the work of tuning all kinds of information and 
media—text, sounds, photos, video, data from instruments and sensors and so on—into the ones 
and zeroes that are the native language of computers and their kin” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson).  
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1. Why Organizational Adoption? 
In the context of organizations, this era, especially the emergence of AI, is forcing 
organizations to “transform or die”; an observation of the current trends relating to 
organizational adoption of AI indicates that this technological transition is a challenging one, 
particularly for large organizations (Gerbert, Justus, Hecker). The difficulty for large 
organizations to adopt new technology is not new, but certain organizations have been more 
“agile” than others, with respect to adopting AI. The second driver for my research was to further 
investigate why certain organizations have been more equipped to adapt and integrate AI into 
organizational processes and the organizational process that has enabled organizations to adopt 
AI.4 
2. How do Sociocultural Values Relate to AI Adoption?  
We are in an age of phenomenal technological change; however, perceptions and beliefs 
regarding what these technological advances diverge; the term “sociocultural” was the term that 
most effectively encapsulated people’s perceptions, beliefs, and values that are shaped by 
cultural and social influences.5 The “leaders of the field of digital economics” believe that “it is 
an inflection point in the right direction—bounty instead of scarcity, freedom instead of 
constraint—but one that will bring with it some difficult challenges and choices” (McAfee and 
                                                
4 AI is reframing traditional sources of competitive advantage; for this reason, organizations are 
facing greater pressure to reassess how they perceive their strengths and how to maintain market 
share; in previous years, positional advantage was dependent upon static business processes: 
proprietary assets, distribution networks, access to customers, and scale. However, in today’s 
environment, organizations “need to identify what machines do better than humans and vice 
versa, develop complementary roles and responsibilities for each ad redesign processes 
accordingly” (Gerbert, Justus, Hecker).  
5 The definition of sociocultural values that is used in this research study is the following: the 
principles or standards of behavior, attitudes, or beliefs of individuals, and the different groups of 
individuals in society and their habits, traditions and beliefs. (Oxford Dictionary, Cambridge 
Dictionary). 
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Brynjolfsson, 11). This is the optimistic view. Even from the optimistic perspective, they 
mention that there are evident and clear challenges to “digitization”; “rapid and accelerating 
digitization is likely to bring economic rather than environmental disruption stemming from the 
fact that as computers get more powerful, companies have less need for certain workers or tasks” 
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 11). In other words, specific types of skills may become obsolete, 
and thus individuals with these skills may be “left behind.”6 From the standpoint of the 
individual, this second-machine-age era signifies a time that will require people to learn to work 
with machines in new ways, learn new skills, innovate in new ways, and adapt. The emergence 
of AI signifies a new type of relationship between man and machine.7 The third driver for my 
research was to further investigate how people operating in different cultures and embodying 
different sociocultural values make sense of this age and AI-infused reality, where a willingness 
to work alongside machines in new ways is both important and necessary. In this way, I was 
interested in researching whether certain sociocultural values predispose people (in the context of 
work) to be more capable or willing to adapt to this form of technological change. I was initially 
interested to study this at the level of the individual, but pivoted to studying it at the level of the 
                                                
6 When referencing that individuals with certain skills might be “left behind” is a phrase used by 
McAfee and Brynjolfsson in their The Second Machine Age (11).  
7 There are diverging opinions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of AI on humans and 
our daily lives. For example, In the Most Human Human by Brian Christain, he mentions that 
“the story of the twenty-first century will be, in part, the story of the drawing and redrawing of 
these battle lines, the story of Homo sapiens trying to stake a claim on shifting ground, flanked 
on both sides by beast and machine, pinned between meat and math. And here’s a crucial, related 
question: Is this retreat a good thing or bad thing? For instance, does the fact that computers are 
so good at mathematics in some sense take away an arena of human activity, or does it free us 
from having more human life?” (Christian, 12). This process of questioning, and the willingness 
or rejection of individuals to perceive AI as a positive or negative influence on society was the 
reason that I decided to investigate the influence of sociocultural values on AI adoption. There is 
a broad range of perceptions of AI and this thesis aimed to evaluate how differing viewpoints 
influence AI adoption.  
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firm because of a lack of necessary data (this is explained in greater detail in Chapter 4). I was 
able to compare organizations operating in different countries and analyze if differing national 
sociocultural values influenced organizational adoption of AI.  
When selecting countries with differing sociocultural values, I referenced social 
psychologist Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001) as a starting point8, and 
combined additional literature to cross-check Hofstede’s cultural characteristics and assess the 
current sociocultural values of individuals in both nations. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are the 
following: the uncertainty avoidance, the Power Distance, Individualism/Collectivism, 
Masculinity/Femininity, and Long Term Orientation/Short Term Orientation. A sixth dimension, 
Indulgence/Restraint, which was added by Hofstede in 2010, will not be discussed or referenced 
in this thesis due to a lack of research yet conducted on this topic. These dimensions are based 
upon the most recent and comprehensive studies of how values in the workplace are influenced 
by culture9 (The Hofstede Center, n.d.a, p.1). Using these dimensions, I selected France and the 
                                                
8 Geert Hofstede(1980) is a researcher in the fields of culture and management; in the 1970s he 
developed a paradigm for the organization and identification of cultures; Hofstede’s work has 
been applied in a variety of fields, most frequently in cross-cultural psychology, international 
management and cross-cultural communication. Hofstede was motivated to determine if 
universal categories of culture existed. His research initially produced four dimensions that are 
applicable to cultures all over the world: power distance; collectivist-individualistic; feminine-
masculine; and uncertainty avoidance. Two additional dimensions were added after subsequent 
research long term orientation and self-restraint (2010). Hofstede identified these dimensions 
after accessing a large survey database about values, attitudes and sentiments of employees 
working at various local subsidiaries of IBM, a multinational corporation. Several researchers, 
universities, and organizations have employed Hofstede’s dimensions in efforts to compare 
national cultures. Hofstede’s Insights is one such organization that has applied these dimensions, 
and I will be referencing the scores that this organization has identified for France and the U.S. 
These scores were cross-referenced with other culture evaluations made by other sources (Binus 
University). 
9 Culture has many definitions. A common definition of the terms is the body of a shared 
knowledge, understanding, and practice in a society. According to the Merriam Webster (2013) 
dictionary, culture is “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior, that 
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U.S. as each country received differing scores on each cultural dimension. After selecting France 
and the U.S., I aggregated research, information, and testimonies pertaining to sociocultural 
values of American and French individuals. These testimonies reinforced that there exists 
sociocultural value differences among individuals living in France and the U.S.10; however, 
concluding that these testimonies influenced organizational adoption was outside of the scope of 
this thesis, due to methodological limitations. However, connections between national 
sociocultural values and organizational adoption could be made. I referenced Geert Hofstede’s 
dimensions to understand the sociocultural value differences between France and the U.S.  
3. Why A Case Study Analysis of Telecommunications Firms?  
I used an analytical case study approach because I identified this method as being an optimal 
way (in terms of its feasibility and attainability) that I could uncover insight about internal 
processes that contributed to organizational adoption of AI. To select the organizations for my 
case study, I extracted insight that I gathered after conducting a comprehensive literature review 
of organizational innovation, technological adoption, and organizational culture. Research 
relating to organizational innovation indicated that a comparative analysis of organizational 
innovation-adoption is best conducted when size, sector, and organization type (private or 
                                                
depends on the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations” and 
“the customary beliefs, social norms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; 
and the set of shared attitudes, values, and practices that characterized by institutions or 
organization.”  
10 These testimonies are analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. They are statements 
made by French and American individuals about their cultures and beliefs. These statements are 
not representative of all French or all American people’s values as they represent statements 
from a small sample size of and were accessed from specific types of articles and publications. 
The primary purpose of including these testimonies was to cite examples of recent statements 
made by French and American individuals about their sociocultural values. Second, it was to 
cross-check Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of France and the U.S. by researching and 
aggregating what actual individuals said about their sociocultural values.  
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public) are similar. In addition, as I reviewed the most recent literature on organizational 
adoption of AI, I found data that was presented at an Economics of AI conference in 2017. The 
data used in the presentations, generated by McKinsey & Company, indicated that the 
telecommunications industry was the industry that had adopted the most AI-related technologies 
at scale or in a core part of the business compared to organizations in other industries. In this 
way, to contribute to the literature on organizational adoption of AI, I selected two organizations 
that are in the same industry (high-tech, telecommunications), size (measured by the number of 
employees), and type (multinational and public). The organizations that I selected were Verizon 
Communications (U.S.) and Orange S.A (France). Both organizations are public multinational 
telecommunications corporations11 and are of comparable size (measured by number of 
employees).  
4. What is a Chatbot and why is a Chatbot representative of Organizational Adoption 
of AI?  
The literature on organizational innovation indicated that selecting organizations that are 
innovation-generating or innovation-adopting as well as identifying a common type of 
innovation permits a more accurate comparative analysis; in the context of AI organizational 
adoption, most organizations are both generating and adopting the technology across sectors and 
are generating or adopting various types of AI. After selecting two telecommunications firms for 
the subjects of my case study analysis, I selected chatbots as the specific type of AI technology 
that I would analyze for several reasons. A chatbot is a program designed to simulate 
conversation with human users, especially over the internet (Oxford Dictionaries). Chatbots can 
                                                
11 Both multinational corporations are publically traded organizations. Verizon communications 
is traded on NYSE (VZ); Orange S.A. is traded on Euronext (ORA), NYSE (ORAN), BIT 
(ORA) (Reuters).  
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recognize the content and context of customers’ requests and questions. For this reason, chatbots 
are one of the most popular AI applications used by telecommunications companies (Tech 
Emergence). 
After conducting research about Orange S.A. and Verizon, there was evidence that chatbots 
were a type of AI technology that both organizations have sought to adopt in the form of 
products; in this way, there was information relating to the deployment and development 
(admittedly still a limited amount) of these chatbots. Analyzing the process by which each 
organization had adopted this type of AI technology was an opportunity for me to gather 
information relating to organizational adoption of AI and second, to compare these adoption 
processes to evaluate if national sociocultural values did influence organizational receptivity or 
capacity to adopt this technology.  
My Research Question 
This thesis attempts to answer the following question: How do national sociocultural 
values influence the rate of adoption of AI in American versus French organizations? The study 
provides a qualitative analysis of existing literature including organizational innovation, 
technological adoption, and organizational culture, as well as an analytical case study, comparing 
a French and an American multinational organization to evaluate the influence of national 
cultural values and organizational adoption of AI.  
The goal of this research was to offer insight on whether organizations operating in 
different nations within the same industry adopt AI at different rates and whether national 
sociocultural values influenced organizational adoption of AI. The limitations of my 
methodology prevented me from conclusively offering insight on this subject. Though a 
conclusion about the influence of sociocultural values on organizational adoption of AI was not 
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possible, resulting from the limitations of my methodological approach, my research contributes 
insight that is relevant for organizations today and in the future.  
My thesis illuminated why a study that explored the influence of national cultural values 
on organizational adoption of technology warrants investigation. My research provided insight 
for future research on the following subjects: organizational adoption of technology, 
organizational adoption of AI, organizational and generation of AI. The primary contribution of 
this thesis was the optimal approach that I identified to comparatively quantify the rate of 
organizational adoption of AI. This approach is defined and thoroughly explained in the Chapter 
4 of the thesis.  
Section II: Introduction to Artificial Intelligence 
Technology is a valuable resource to an organization and thus has critical implications to 
its competitiveness and long-term profitability. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is forecasted to be the 
most transformative technology of the future and its disruptive potential is “already here” 
(Ransnotham, Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). In a short time, AI has become mainstream and is rapidly 
permeating and transforming entire sectors of economies worldwide; 2016 was the year that, “AI 
came into its own for mainstream businesses” (Hardy). Organizations in agriculture, 
manufacturing, aviation, and “every other sector of the economy,” are adopting AI (Hardy); they 
recognize the benefits and acknowledge that AI initiatives are imperative as real-world gains 
exist. In addition to reframing specific sources of competitive advantage, AI helps increase the 
rate and quality of decision making. For specific tasks, the number of inputs and the speed of 
processing for machines can be millions of times higher than they are for humans. Amidst this 
opportunity to increase productivity, profitability and businesses processes, organizations must 
adapt to remain competitive (Brynjolfsson and McAfee). 
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The capacity for organizations to adapt to technological change by adopting technology 
has been a competitive necessity for organizations ever since the first industrial revolution 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee). One specific technology that has emerged is artificial intelligence. 
Theories of AI have existed since 1950 (Miller); AI itself, however, gained wider functional 
applicability only in the past few decades, resulting from advances such as improved algorithms and 
training methods, greater computing power, and the availability of large amounts of data in the cloud 
enabled (Miller). Artificial intelligence has a variety of applications. Most of the advances in 
artificial intelligence in business contexts have been focused on specific applications 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee). This narrow artificial intelligence includes natural language 
processing, intelligent agents, computer vision, machine learning, expert systems, autonomous 
cars, chatbots and voice recognition and are used to preform specific tasks such as 
recommending songs on Pandora (Vazirani, Morvan, Hintermann, Daugherty).  
A second type of artificial intelligence is referred to as human-level or general AI, which 
pertains to artificial intelligence that “successfully demonstrates all capabilities of a person,” 
according to Oren Etzioni (Baggaley); this type of AI is still in early stages. This distinction is 
important, as my thesis, and the case study analyses that I will conduct where I quantify the rate 
of organizational adoption of AI will pertain only to the “narrow forms” of artificial intelligence 
that were identified above (robotics and autonomous vehicles, computer vision, language, virtual 
agents, and machine learning, which includes deep learning and underpins many recent advances 
in the other AI technologies). Human-level AI will not be included in my analysis.  
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Section III: An Overview of the Global Trends of Organizational Adoption of AI 
Variation Among AI Adopters Across Industries 
Industry seems to be a factor in an organizations ability to adopt AI, but not a significant 
factor. Insight summarized by MIT’S Sloan Management Review and Boston Consulting Group, 
concluded that the, “differences in adoption [are] striking, particularly within the same industry” 
(Ransnotham, Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). Even in industries with extensive histories of integrating 
new technologies and managing data, barriers to AI adoption can be difficult to overcome 
(Ransnotham, Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). The differences with respect to organizational adoption 
of AI are “less about technological limitations and much more about business”; in this way, the 
two main barriers to AI adoption (identified in this study) are the following: competing 
investment priorities and unclear business cases for AI. McKinsey Global Institutes similarly 
concludes that “sector-by-sector adoption of AI is highly uneven” (Bughin, Trench, Henke, 
Dahlstrom, Chui, Ramaswamy, Hazan). This pattern in the adoption of technology is 
representative of a common adoption curve and reflects Rogers’s innovation adoption curve12. 
Such variation across industry, “implies that, at least in the near future, AI deployment is likely 
to accelerate at the digital frontier, expanding the gap between adopters and laggards across 
companies, industries, and geographic regions” (Bughin, Trench, Henke, Dahlstrom, Chui, 
Ramaswamy, Hazan). A similar industry-variation of “early adopters” was identified in 
Embracing Digital Technology (Fitzgerald, Kruschwitz, Bonnet, Welch).  
The leading sectors, according to McKinsey’s Industry Digitization Index, are those in 
                                                
12 The Rogers innovation adoption curve relates to the diffusion of innovation theory which will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. This curve is a model that classifies adopters of 
innovations (such as technology) into specific groups (innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority, and laggards (Rogers).  
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the high-tech sector such as telecommunications and financial services. These are industries with 
“long histories of digital investment” (Bughin, Trench, Henke, Dahlstrom, Chui, Ramaswamy, 
Hazan)13. Though these sectors are leading in developing and adopting digital tools, “even these 
sectors are far behind in AI adoption when compared with overall digitization” (Bughin, 
McCarthy, Chui). Sectors with the most developed digital capabilities correlates with a greater 
capacity to adopt AI. A Harvard Business Review article summarized the findings of a study of 
AI that surveyed 3,073 executives, and identified that “industries leading AI adoption, “such as 
high tech, telecom, and automotive, are also the ones that are the most digitized” (Bughin, 
McCarthy, Chui). In addition, when analyzing companies within the same industry, those that 
have invested in digital capabilities (cloud infrastructures, big data, etc.) are the organizations 
leading organizational adoption of AI14. Analyses conducted by Accenture indicate that different 
sectors are leading AI adoption than those identified by McKinsey Global Institute15. The 
Accenture report, Boost Your AIQ: Transforming into an AI, identified digital platform and IT 
software and services as the industries that are “pioneers in the development of AI technologies 
and applications.” (Vazirani, Morvan, Hintermann, Daugherty).  
A Gap Between Organizational Expectation and Adoption of AI 
                                                
13 A McKinsey Global Institute report titled AI: The Next Digital Frontier, identified that 
organizations that have been better equipped to adopt AI are those with a digital foundation; in 
this way, for an organization to successfully adopt AI, it “cannot delay their digital journeys” and 
“must address many elements of a digital and analytics transformation: identify the business 
case, set up the right data ecosystem, build or buy appropriate AI tools adapt work ow processes, 
capabilities, and culture (Bughin, Trench, Henke, Dahlstrom, Chui, Ramaswamy, Hazan).  
14 A Harvard Business Review article concluded that the “odds of generating profit from using 
AI are 50% higher for companies that have strong experience in digitization” (Bughin, 
McCarthy, Chui). 
15 Accenture’s report Boost Your AIQ: Transforming into an AI Business (Vazirani, Morvan, 
Hintermann, Daugherty) and McKinsey Global Institute’s report (AI: The Next Digital Frontier) 
were published in 2017. 
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In Reshaping Business with Artificial Intelligence, the results obtained from an annual 
survey16 conducted by MIT’s Sloan Management Review and The Boston Consulting Group, 
concluded that only nineteen percent of the organizations that they surveyed qualified as “early 
adopters of AI” (Ransnotham, Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). These results indicated that there “is a 
disparity between expectation and action” as it relates to organizational adoption of AI 
(Ransnotham, Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). Although approximately eighty-percent of executives 
agree that AI is a strategic opportunity for their organization, only approximately twenty-five 
percent of organizations incorporated AI in their business offerings or processes (Ransnotham, 
Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). In addition, the report indicated that ten percent of organizations have 
extensively incorporated AI in their offerings or processes. Accenture’s AIQ Report identified a 
similar “organizational AI adoption gap” with regards the testimonies of executives of 
organizations that mentioned that AI was an organizational priority and their organization’s 
successful adoption of AI. Though investment in AI is “heating up,” the figures gathered from a 
variety of sources indicates that corporate adoption of AI technology is “lagging” (Chui, Bughin, 
McCarthy) which demonstrates that organizational adoption of AI is still in its infancy.  
Firm Size: A Contributing Factor for Organizational Adoption of AI 
The reports conducted by various organizations indicate that firm size does seem to 
influence organizational adoption of AI. When analyzing firms that have adopted AI, a similar 
digital divide exists: large firms have much higher rates of adoption and awareness (Vazirani, 
Morvan, Hintermann, Daugherty). Across sectors, larger firms (which Accenture denotes as 
                                                
16 MIT Sloan Management Review and The Boston Consulting Group conducts an inaugural 
survey of approximately three thousand business executives, managers, and analysts from 
organizations around the world. This specific survey was an intentional effort to “understand the 
challenges and opportunities associated with the use of artificial intelligence” (Ransnotham, 
Kiron, Gerbert, Reeves). 
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those with more than 500 employees) are at least 10 percent more likely than smaller firms to 
have adopted at least one AI technology at scale or in a core part of their business. In sectors 
with lower rates of AI uptake, the adoption rate of bigger companies was as much as 300 percent 
that of smaller companies (Vazirani, Morvan, Hintermann, Daugherty).  
Larger firms typically have access to more and better-structured data, and are more likely 
to have employees with the technical skills needed to understand the business case for AI 
investment and to successfully engage suppliers. These larger firms also have an advantage in 
comparison to smaller firms because the kind of fixed-cost investment required for AI generates 
higher returns when applied to a larger base of costs and revenue (MIT Sloan Management 
Review and Deloitte). As new technologies appear, startups can act with an agility that is beyond 
the reach of large organizations. Indeed, agility is more important than company size in 
determining success. The challenges big companies have in harnessing technology, data and 
talent are, if anything, even greater at startups. As the scale of the technology giants continues to 
grow exponentially, startups need an even higher artificial intelligence quotient (AIQ) for 
collaboration to compensate for the high costs of innovation. 
 
Section IV: A Comparative Analysis of Organizational Adoption of AI  
AI is a form of innovation17 that organizations across sectors and countries identify as a 
valuable investment to remain competitive; the two processes of organizational innovation is via 
generation (creating the technology internally) or adoption (using a technology developed 
                                                
17 Technology is an element or component of innovation. Some innovations are technology 
based; others are not. Technological innovation is only a type of organizational innovation. 
(Damanpour) 
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outside of the organization). Distinguishing these two processes of organizational innovation, 
permits a critical analysis of AI in France and the U.S.  
An analysis of AI-related data (investment, number of AI startups, AI patents, etc.) 
indicates that with respect to AI generation and adoption, the U.S. is leading France.18 Yves 
Demazeau, a Director of Research at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), stated 
at the 2016 AI conference that France is still comparatively lagging other countries, including the 
U.S. in AI innovation. Since the definition of “innovation” includes generation and adoption, it 
can be concluded that the U.S. is leading France in AI generation (creating new forms of AI) and 
adoption (using externally-developed AI). Though multiple sources validate that the U.S. is 
leading France in “the race to dominate AI,” it is more difficult to identify and quantify 
organizational adoption as this data is less accessible19. Since there is limited company-specific 
data relating to AI adoption of organizations in France and the U.S., I will first give a brief 
overview of the AI ecosystem in France and the U.S. to set the stage for my research study, as 
well as summarize the current state of AI organizational adoption in France and the U.S. The 
data that I will analyze is the following: startup investment and AI organizational adoption data. I 
will not be addressing data or metrics that pertain to generation (creating) of AI, as interpreting 
this type of this data is beyond the scope of my research study. For this reason, data pertaining to 
AI patents, intellectual property, and AI startups, will not be addressed.  
AI Organizational Adoption Ecosystems in France and the U.S. 
                                                
18 This French ‘AI gap’ may be shrinking, as the Economist estimates that Paris is quickly 
becoming a global leader of AI innovation (The Economist). 
19 Certain Management Consulting companies have quantified “early adopters” of AI, or have 
gathered data to quantify company-specific AI generation and adoption strategies such as 
McKinsey Global Institute; the organizations included in these reports are only American 
companies. 
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When comparing the AI ecosystem (measured by AI research, patents, and AI-related 
projects at universities, AI startups, policy initiatives addressing AI, multi-stakeholder 
partnerships collaborating on AI usage, and large companies leveraging AI) in France and in the 
U.S., there are noticeable differences; the U.S. is leading France in each category (Wu). Among 
the large organizations, technology and digital platform companies such as Google, Amazon, 
Facebook and Apple are spearheading AI innovations and attracting entrepreneurship 
(Accenture). In addition, with respect to AI research, the U.S. is leading France. Microsoft, IBM, 
and Google are the leading companies in AI research (MIT Technology Review). According to 
the Economist article, U.S. companies, specifically Google, leads in the race to dominate 
artificial intelligence. Measured by talent, computing power and data, Google appears to be in 
the lead in AI (The Economist).   
American organizations also lead France with respect to AI startup investment20, which 
includes startup financing deals and dollars invested by venture capitalists. In the period of 2010 
and 2016, the United States’ AI startup ecosystem dominated in these categories compared to 
France (Krause). In 2016, global investment in AI increased by 60% compared to previous years; 
more than five billion dollars was invested in the sector. The majority (approximately sixty-two 
percent of the AI startup21 “deals”) were for American startups, whereas French startups 
                                                
20 Startup investment pertains to organizational adoption of AI, as it is an indicator of active 
efforts to expand use cases of AI. Merger and acquisitions of AI startups and large companies is 
also an indicator of adoption. Acquiring a startup, a strategic decision to integrate externally 
developed AI into internal business processes.  
21 AI startups refer to small organizations that utilize AI technology. These startups are applying 
AI in a variety of industries including education, healthcare, security, advertising, tourism, or 
finance.  
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accounted for only three percent (French Accelerator). In addition, organizations in the AI sector 
have received higher valuations compared to those in France (approximately 2.4 times higher).  
A large fraction of organizations globally are in the process of implementing AI, or have 
integrated the technology. A comparison of these organizations indicates that the U.S. is where 
thirty eight percent of the “early adopter” organizations are located (38%); whereas Western 
European nations only account for nine percent of “early adopters” (Krause). Certain 
organizations are both generating and adopting AI, and the majority of these organizations are 
American. For example, Alphabet (formerly known as Google) spent between twenty and thirty 
billion dollars on AI in 2016. Ninety percent of this was spent on R&D and deployment, and ten 
percent was spent on AI acquisitions (Columbus). The “future projections” that forecast the 
economic impact of AI by 2035 on select G20 countries reinforce that France is lagging with 
respect to organizational adoption of AI. The report indicated that the economic growth rate of 
the U.S. will increase from 3.5 to 4.6; comparatively, France’s growth rate is estimated to 
increase from 1.7 to 2.9 (Accenture).  
Identified Barriers to AI Innovation 
Certain factors have been identified as inhibiting France’s capacity to generate and adopt 
AI, whereas U.S. may be a more conducive environment for AI innovation and AI organizational 
adoption. The factors that have been identified range from economic, political, and social 
barriers. The following are the most commonly identified factors: public image of AI, weakness 
of means, relations with industry and insufficient support from authorities (Genot, Gibb, 
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Oubuih), uncompetitive data privacy policies, underdeveloped digital infrastructure,22 
uncompetitive tax regimes, and structural economic problems. There are AI-facilitative factors in 
France that encourage AI innovation which includes human capital (in the form of skilled 
engineers and AI-proficient individuals), and a well-established science and tech infrastructure. 
However, data privacy regulations are perceived as “the crux of the sector’s future 
competitiveness” (Genot, Gibb, Oubuih). In the U.S., however, permissive data policies persist, 
rather than protective ones that are favorable for AI innovation.   
In conclusion, the U.S. is leading France with respect to AI innovation (generation and 
adoption), as the majority of organizations that are “leading the race for AI” are American (The 
Economist). Companies in this category such as Alphabet, Microsoft, IBM, and Amazon are 
both generating and adopting AI, as they are investing in AI R&D to generate new AI 
technology as well as adopting AI developed externally in the form of acquiring AI startups. 
Since “adoption” is used to characterize organizations that are both generating and adopting AI, 
it is difficult to identify or compare organizational adoption-specific in the U.S. compared with 
France. My research study separates generation from adoption and evaluates data specifically 
relating to organizations adopting (using) AI.  
                                                
22 One reason for the U.S. leading France in AI innovation could be a result of France’s 
underdeveloped digital capabilities relative to the U.S. (2015, Banfi, Bressand, Hazan, 
Labaye)22 ; France’s ranking on OECD’s network readiness index demonstrates that it is behind 
the U.S. with respect to its technological infrastructure.) The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) generates a Network Readiness Index, which ranks 
countries by assessing the factors, policies, and institutions that enable a nation to fully leverage 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) for increased competitiveness and well-
being. In comparing the relative rankings of countries in this index from the inception of the 
index in 2001 to its most recent compilation in 2106, the U.S. had a ranking of #1 in 2001 and 
dropped to #7 in 2016. France has sustained a relatively constant ranking (it has dropped from 
#24 to #26) from 2001 to 2016.  (OECD) 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
My research objective is to quantify and subsequently compare the “rate of adoption” of 
AI among French and U.S. organizations of comparable sizes, sectors, and type (private or 
public). This research question overlaps with concepts that pertain to a variety of disciplines 
including sociology, economics, psychology, and business; in this way, the literature review 
encompasses multiple fields of research including, organizational innovation, firm-level 
technological adoption, and organizational culture. This multi-component literature review 
enables me to comprehensively review the existing literature that pertains to my research study. 
It is divided into three sections; Section I reviews organizational innovation research, providing a 
high-level overview of my topic; Section II is a review of a specific stream of research within 
organizational innovation research. It reviews studies relating to organizational adoption of 
technology, specifically organizational adoption AI. Section III specifies my contribution to the 
literature.  
Section I: Organizational Innovation 
The capacity to continuously adapt, transform, and integrate new processes enables an 
organization to maintain its competitiveness in today’s world. The topic of organizational 
adoption has inspired voluminous studies intended to study and explain why one organization is 
better equipped to adopt innovation, compared to a second organization (Gordon, Kimberly, and 
MacEchron, 1975). As a result of the volume of research across disciplines that has been 
conducted on this subject,23 the results at the empirical level often are noncomparable and 
                                                
23 A comprehensive literature review conducted by Kelly and Franzberg (1978) indicated that 
more than 4,000 items in their analysis of research of technological innovation.  
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occasionally contradictory (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981).24  
Research on innovation has been conducted in many fields of study including science and 
engineering, humanities and art, and social sciences; in addition, these studies have employed 
various levels of analysis to study innovation, including individual, group, organization, industry, 
and economy (Baldridge and Burnham, 1975; Damapour and Schneider, 2006; Kimberly and 
Evanisko, 1981; Sears and Baba, 2011). An innovation can either be a new product, a new 
service, a new technology, or a new administrative practice (Hage, 1999) and organizational 
innovation refers to the study of innovation in organizations, both private and public 
organizations (Damanpour). Organizational innovation research investigates the external and 
internal conditions that are conducive to innovation, the strategies that organizations employ to 
manage the innovation process, and the influence of innovation on an organization (Damanpour).  
This literature review will discuss the specific insights of organizational innovation 
research that pertains to organizational adoption of technology25; the non-technical concepts are 
beyond the scope of this study and will not be covered in detail. The concept of innovation is 
broad and includes multiples types of innovations: technology is only one type of innovation that 
organizations generate or adopt. I will summarize the antecedents of organizational innovation of 
technology that have been identified, as this directly applies to my research.   
                                                
24 A tremendous amount of research has been conducted and several attempts to summarize the 
research demonstrated that “much remains to be learned about the conditions for and 
consequences of innovation” (Brewer, 1980; Kelly & Kranzberg, 1978; Kimberly, 1981; Nelson 
& Winter, 1977; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971; Utterback, 1974; Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 
1973).  
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Organizational Innovation The two processes that facilitate organizational innovation 
is adoption and generation (Damanpour). Adoption and generation are separate concepts and 
distinct processes; organizations can adopt and generate innovation (as evident by Alphabet, 
Amazon, and various other organizations identified in Chapter one). Innovation generation or 
innovation adoption differ with respect to their environmental contexts, organizational 
conditions, and antecedents (Porter, 1985). Innovations span a variety of forms and therefore the 
perceived importance of specific types of innovation influences the way in which an organization 
adopts innovation (Porter, 1985), and results in dissimilar organizational innovation patterns. 
There exist multiple theoretical perspectives and approaches to understand organizational 
innovation (rational, institutional, political, cultural, learning, interpretive, interactional), and 
each is accompanied by constraints stemming from disciplinary discourse or methodological 
disposition. (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Damanpour & Gopalakrishnan, 1998; Sturdy, 2004; Van 
de Ven & Rogers, 1988). Each perspective offers different explanations of the motivation for and 
consequences of the generation and adoption of innovation in organizations (Damanpour). 
The Process of Innovation Generation and Adoption: Organizations generate and 
adopt innovations to improve the efficiency of the organization, maintain competitiveness, or 
achieve short-term and long-term goals (Damanpour). Generation and adoption are distinct 
processes as it pertains to organizational innovation (Damanpour & Gopalakrishnan, 1998).26 
Generation is a process of introducing a new product, service, process, or practice to the market. 
                                                
1. At the level of innovation, the process includes three sequential phases: generation, 
diffusion, and adoption. Diffusion is a process in which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels among the members of a social system (Rogers, 1995). 
Diffusion connects generation to adoption, is studied at the level of population, and is not 
viewed as an organizational process. Hence, it is not discussed in this article. 
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Generation includes organizational activities that pertain to creating new ideas, testing ideas, and 
deploying these new products to the market and to consumers (Roberts, 1988). Adoption is the 
process of using a product, service, or practice that was not developed by the adopting 
organization (Angle and Van de Ven, 1989). The adoption process includes recognizing a 
problem, searching for solutions, deciding on a course of action to address the identified 
problem, implementation of the solution, sustained implementation, and eventually termination 
(Angle and Van de Ven, 1989; Hage and Aiken, 1970; Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990).  
The generation process is unsystematic, chaotic and disorderly, as it more closely 
resembles a random process of chance; the adoption process is more methodical and orderly, and 
is typically a “progression of phases” (Cheng and Van de Ven, 1996; Damanpour and 
Wischnevsky, 2006). The generation process is slower in comparison to the adoption process as 
a result of its chaotic nature. The characteristics, antecedents, and stages of adoption and 
generation are different; in this way, distinguishing adoption from generation is important in 
order to accurately analyze how organizations the factors that motivate innovation, and how 
innovating occurs.   
Antecedents of Organizational Innovation: Understanding organizational 
conditions that induce innovation is a highly attractive endeavor to researchers and business 
managers alike (Damapour); for this reason, the majority of research that pertains to 
organizational innovation focuses on identifying its antecedents. The specific conditions under 
which organizations can innovate remains broad; for this reason, antecedents are the commonly 
used term when referring to factors that relate to an organization’s innovativeness. Antecedent 
refers to an element or characteristic that that existed before an occurrence; it does not indicate a 
causal relationship between the observed characteristic and an outcome. An antecedent is distinct 
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from a determinant. The current research that has been conducted has been limited to observing 
and identifying factors that precede innovation and making inferences based on research about 
these antecedents; however, conclusive evidence indicating that a factor is conducive or is a 
determinant of organizational innovation has not been obtained.  
The antecedents of organizational innovation that were determined in multiple reviews of 
preexisting studies, relate to three categories: environmental (external, contextual), 
organizational (structure, culture), and managerial (leadership, human capital) (Damanpour). I 
will provide a broad overview of three categories of antecedents, as a myriad number of 
variables have been associated with each dimension, and qualitative and quantitative reviews to 
identify salient antecedents have been conducted (Damanpour). The complexity of both 
innovation and performance constructs combined with myriad indicators for their measurement 
has prevented rigorous evidence on conditions and the extent to which the generation or adoption 
of innovation contributes to organizational performance (Damanpour). 
Environmental Antecedents: Environmental Antecedents: Environmental conditions 
influence organizations motivation to engage in innovation (Damanpour). Different sets of 
environmental-related factors have been identified in various research studies on organizational 
innovation; the identification of different factors demonstrates the importance of academic 
discipline that the study is affiliated with, the process that is being studied (generation versus 
adoption, and the innovation type (technological or nontechnological) when studying and 
predicting organizational innovation.  
Several systematic reviews have been conducted on organizational innovation; these 
studies have aggregated the environmental antecedents that are conducive to organizational 
innovation. (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010) combined studies from 1981-2008 and identified 
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organization, technology, market, and innovation types as environmental antecedents. 
(Damanpour and Aravind, 2006) reviewed publications spanning 1983-2003, concluding that 
competition, concertation, technological opportunity, appropriability conditions, and growth of 
demand as contextual antecedents of innovation. The studies differed with respect to field of 
study (economic or management), innovation process, and innovation type (technological or 
nontechnological). (Damanpour and Aravind, 2006) was a review of economic journals, and 
included technological innovations, and studied generation of innovations. In contrast, (Crossan 
and Apaydin) reviewed articles published in management journals, analyzing both technological 
and nontechnological forms of innovation, and studied adoption of innovation (Crossan, and 
Apaydin, 2010). The dissimilar variables that each review identified is a result of these 
differences.  
Several studies on innovation adoption have demonstrated that context, with regards to 
the type of organization does influence the adoption process; in this way, environmental 
variables differ depending on the type of organization (public or private); “the typical 
environmental variables in public organizations are urbanization, deprivation, ethnicity, political 
orientation, and community affluence (Boyne, 2002; Damanpour & Schneider, 2009; 
Walker, 2008), in business organizations they are market competition, industry structure, 
governmental regulation, technological intensity, supplier power, and customer demand (Cohen 
& Levin, 1989; Roberts & Amit, 2003; Schilling, 2013). 
Organizational Antecedents: Internal organizational conditions indicate an 
organizations intention or ability to innovate. Innovation in an organization requires financial 
and human resources, an innovating-conducive culture, processes, systems, policies, and a 
management structure. The varying organizational factors identified in both meta-analyses and 
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systematic review indicates that field of study, process, and innovation type influence the 
variables (Damanpour and Aravind, 2012) (Crossan and Apaydin 2010). The seven factors that 
were consistent when comparing publications from 1971-1988 and 1990-2009 were the 
following professionalism, specialization, technical knowledge resources, functional 
differentiation, management attitude toward change, organizational culture, learning, strategy, 
and internal and external communication (Damanpour and Aravind, 2012). In reviews published 
in management journals, additional factors were added. Keupp, Palmie, & Gassmann (2012) 
grouped organizational antecedents into intended/emergent initiatives (R&D investment, 
technology sourcing, competitive strategy), internal organization (size, culture, structural 
integration), managerial/ownership issues (human resources, ownership, process management), 
and resources (prior performance, knowledge and capabilities, slack) (p. 374) (Damanpour and 
Aravind, 2012).Of these factors, organizational culture and organizational size have received 
significant research attention.27  
                                                
27Since the 1980s, several studies have been conducted to examine if certain dimensions of 
sociocultural values could explain certain types of organizational culture (Damanpour). Hofstede 
(1980) concluded that national culture was different across countries and these sociocultural 
value differences influence organizational culture and employee behavior in organizations. The 
influence and relationship between organizational and national culture was first identified in the 
early 1980s and the idea of organizational culture remains central to the way many managers 
think and feel about their organizational experiences and continues to draw scholarly attention 
(Alvesson, 2011). Managers became aware of the social characteristics of organizations in some 
ways resemble the cultural characteristics of societies (Smircich & Calas, 1986). Subsequent 
research explored the relationship between the national and organizational cultures, investigating 
how they might be similar or different, as well as how organizational culture might moderate or 
negate the effect of national culture. The conclusions drawn from these studies indicated that 
organizational culture, is “an internal attribute of the organization that is socially constructed, 
historically determined, holistic, and difficult to change” (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv & Sanders 
1990).   
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Organizational culture and national culture are distinct cultures (Hofstede). The reason 
for this distinction, is that employees enter organizations after their national cultural values, 
attitudes, and fundamental beliefs are well developed, whereas organizational practices are 
learned through workplace socialization (Hofstede et al., 1990); in this way, entry to and 
transmittal of organizational culture occur in different ways and at different times from national 
culture. According to various studies, behavioral norms is indicated as a fundamental element of 
organizational culture.28 Moreover, individuals are only partly involved with an organizational 
culture as compared to totally immersed in their national culture. Therefore, the influence of 
organizational norms must be considered in concert with societal culture in understanding the 
causes of behavior in organizations. If a society’s culture is resistant to change than and that this 
resistance is typically too strong for a work organization to overcome (Sage Publications).29  
Organizational culture has received significant research attention; organizational size is a 
unique organizational factor, however as it is the “most widely research antecedent of innovation 
across disciplinary fields” (Damanpour). Two arguments prevail concerning organizational size. 
First, small organizations are able to more quickly adapt, make decisions, and thus better 
equipped to innovate (Damanpour, 2010; Nord and Tucker, 1987; Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). 
Second, large organizations are more competent innovators because of their influx of capital, 
financial resources, cross-fertilization of ideas, greater technical knowledge, and can benefit 
from economies of scale. (Damanpour, 2010; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990; Nord and 
                                                
28 Norms are what guide and influence how people behave; whereas, culture tells them the inhere 
meaning of the situation (D’Andrade, 1989). 
29 This conclusion does not mean that national or societal cultures are only static; there are 
studies indicating that culture do change overtime through processes such as acculturation (Kara 
and Peterson, 2012).  
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Tucker, 1987). The results from several analyses indicate that larger firms introduce a greater 
volume of innovations compared to smaller firms; however, this study notes that more recent 
analyses on size-innovation relationship may support a different theory (Chandy and 
Tellis, 2000, p. 8). 
Managerial Antecedents Leaders and executives at organizations influence an 
organization’s capacity to innovate, as they are uniquely able to predict, strategize, and interpret 
environmental characteristics as well as market opportunities, initiating new action, changing 
business processes, and motivating employees. (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Damanpour and 
Schneider, 2006; Elenkov, Judge, and Wright, 2005, West and Anderson, 1996). The managerial 
characteristics of leaders that have been identified include: demographic (age, gender, education, 
experience), personality (agreeableness, authoritarianism, openness to experience) and 
behavioral (inspirational motivation, championing innovation, contingent rewards). Other factors 
that have been identified include: transformational leadership, change-oriented behavior, 
favorable attitude and disposition toward change, and skills and ability to create a climate 
supportive of innovation as key managerial characteristics (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010; de Vries 
et al., 2016; Ekvall and Arvonen, 1991). Managers who embody these attitudes are able to more 
effectively influence an innovation-conducive environment (encouraging teamwork, unity 
among co-workers, optimal allocation of resources, etc) (Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; 
Madjar, Oldham, and Pratt, 2002; Mumford, 2000). An additional key factor that pertains to 
leadership is the ability of organizations to select “good ideas” which is identified as being more 
important than leaders that simply encourage the generation of ideas (Grant, 2016).  
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In conclusion managerial factors, environmental factors, and organizational factors all 
play an important role in enabling an organization to innovate, specifically with regards to 
adopting technology.  
Conclusion: The various factors that have been identified indicate that several 
components of organizations must be considered when attempting to research organizational 
innovation and particularly when attempting to conduct a comparative study. Since innovation 
antecedents did differ depending on innovation type and process, selecting organizations that are 
innovation-generating or innovation-adopting as well as identifying a common type of 
innovation will permit a more accurate analysis.30 Second, the differences between antecedent-
innovation relationship with organizations of different sizes, type (public or private) and industry 
(financial services, high-tech, low-tech) is important when selecting organizations for future 
organizational innovation research.  
Section II: Organizational Adoption of AI  
Though significant empirical research on organizational adoption has been conducted, 
there exists significant opportunities to conclusively identify the conditions or factors of 
innovation (Brewer, 1980; Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978; Kimberly, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 
1977; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Utterback, 1974; Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek, 1973). 
Three primary categories of organizational innovation antecedents were identified above. As a 
result of the volume of research across disciplines that has been conducted on this subject, the 
results at the empirical level often are noncomparable and occasionally contradictory (Kimberly 
and Evanisko, 1981).  
                                                
30 An acknowledgement of the disciplinary biases of the field of study of research is equally 
important for future researchers. 
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These basic, but significant issues in previous work, helped me frame my honors thesis 
research, as well as decide to narrow the remaining portion of this literature review to AI-specific 
organizational adoption research.  
Of interest in this thesis is organizational adoption of artificial intelligence. A significant 
amount of reports, articles, and publications on this specific subject has originated from 
management consulting companies. In addition, a new stream of economics research has 
emerged, that is devoted to the subject of artificial intelligence (Economics of AI).31 Reviewing 
these streams of research provides a comprehensive, though certainly not an exhaustive 
representation of the current research regarding organizational adoption of AI.  
Applying a varying and multi-methodological approach32, management consulting 
companies have defined organizational adoption of AI as a type of “transformation” (Accenture, 
                                                
31 Organizational adoption of AI was discussed in the conference and the observations about this 
subject is consistent with the literature that was previously reviewed in other chapters of this 
thesis (the other AI-related subjects will not be discussed as they are beyond the scope of this 
study). The information presented about AI organizational adoption (firms adopting AI that was 
developed outside of the firm) was treated an aggregate concept with organizational generation 
(firms creating new forms of AI). In addition, the articles and presentations evaluated firm 
adoption of AI in the context of competition. Machine Learning, Market Structure & 
Competition (Shapiro, Varian) identified important AI inputs that are scarce (data infrastructure, 
software, hardware, expertise, and firm-specific labeled data). Incumbents, large established 
organizations, were identified as possibly having a competitive advantage of AI relative to other 
firms with less access to data. A second advantage of incumbents was that they can “learn how to 
improve algorithms and business processes” (Shaprio and Varian). The “key enablers of AI 
adoption” that were identified were: leadership, technical ability, and data access. 
32 The reports pertaining to AI organizational adoption published by management consulting 
organizations, in partnership with academic institutions, professors, students, and research 
facilities indicate that there are identifiable characteristics of organizations that have been able to 
adopt AI. The characteristics are identified using data gathered from surveys of companies 
internationally. The specific strategies employed by these companies is not revealed in the 
reports, nor are the identities of the companies identified as “early adopters.” Multiple metrics 
and indicators exist to measure “AI pioneers” and rate of adoption of AI of organizations across 
sectors, sizes, and nations. The surveys, interviews, and data that were used to conclude that AI 
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BCG, McKinsey & Company, Deloitte). As these companies have analyzed the “AI 
transformations,”33 of firms, and the strategies that these AI-adopting organizations have used to 
“intelligently transform,” antecedents have been identified. The antecedents observed by these 
companies are mostly consistent with the antecedents identified in organizational innovation 
adoption literature: environmental (external, contextual), organizational (structure, culture), and 
managerial (leadership, human capital) (Damanpour).34  
One difference is that nested antecedents have been observed; organizational digital 
strategies (MIT Sloan Management Review and Deloitte)35 have been identified as a primary 
                                                
organizational adoption is lagging in certain countries, and that firm size and industry do 
influence the ability of an organization to adopt AI were concluded based on research included 
insights from individuals in 112 countries and 21 industries, from organizations of various sizes 
(MIT Sloan school of Management and Deloitte). Accenture’s study included several in-depth 
interviews with more than 45 leading AI experts, corporate executives, entrepreneurs, research 
institutions, academics and policy representatives from 10 G20 countries (Australia, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom and the United States). 
Similarly, BCG Henderson’s and McKinsey & Company’s reports included organizations of 
varying sizes, industry, and nationality. 
33 In the literature, firm-level technological adoption is dependent upon an “organizational 
transformation” (Brynjolfsson, Erik and McAfee, Andrew); in the case of an organization 
adopting digital technologies (McKinsey & Company). In this way, the definition of “adoption” 
has evolved from Carr’s earlier definition; it is defined today as choice of a firm to take specific 
action to optimally enable a form of innovation (such as technology) to be utilized by a firm 
either for internal or external purposes. This definition of adoption will be used for the rest of 
this thesis.  
34 In addition to AI organizational adoption research, Management Consultant companies have 
also explored organizational adoption of digital technologies. Digital adoption refers to a process 
by which a firm adopts digital technologies which include social media, mobile, analytics, 
embedded devices, or artificial intelligence (McKinsey & Company, AI the Next Digital 
Frontier); “intelligent” transformations, however, refers only to firms adopting AI technology 
(McKinsey & Company).  
35 MIT Sloan Management Review and Deloitte’s 2015 global study of digital business titled, 
“Strategy, not Technology, Drives Digital Transformation” found that businesses that have been 
able to integrate digital technologies, such as social, mobile, analytics and cloud, in the service of 
transforming how their businesses operate are able to develop and implement a well-defined 
digital strategy. The report underlines that a “clear digital strategy” enables organizations to 
“digitally reimagine [their] business” (MIT Sloan Management Review and Deloitte) and 
optimally benefit from new technologies. 
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antecedent to organizational adoption of AI, and an antecedent of a successful digital strategy is 
organizational culture. A second difference is that an organization’s leadership influences 
organizational culture.  
In addition to these differences there are also limitations of these studies. A basic 
limitation relying on organizational adoption of AI research is that adoption refers to both 
adoption and generation; in this way, concluding antecedents of organizational adoption of AI 
from these studies is an inaccurate analysis of the research.36 A second limitation, relating to the 
reports of management consultancies such as Accenture, McKinsey & Company, BCG, and 
Deloitte relates to the accessibility of the data and testimonies from which the conclusions are 
derived.  
The articles published by management consultant companies indicate the hardest factor 
or primary antecedent in organizational transformations (digital or AI) is an organization’s 
culture (Bilefield, McKinsey & Company) and the execution of this a technological strategy 
relies on the organization’s culture, which is influenced by the organization’s leadership 
(Accenture).37 The specific values that are embodied by this type of AI-adoption conducive 
                                                
36 With regards to firm adoption of artificial intelligence, trends of adoption were identified as 
being heterogeneous in both timing of adoption and ability to use AI effectively across industries 
(Shaprio, Varian). Since adoption and generation are used as similar concepts in this 
presentation, these findings begin to extend beyond the scope of my research as organizational 
generation of AI is not the focus of my research. For this reason, the conclusions concerning AI 
heterogeneous adoption patterns, “key enablers”, and the advantages (in terms of AI-adoption 
inputs) of incumbents (large firms) will only be loosely applied to my research; it was, however, 
still necessary to review the publications and material in the field of AI economics as it relates to 
my study.  
 
37 The extent to which the leaders of the organization, “foster a culture able to change and invent 
the new” (MIT Sloan Management Review and Deloitte) and this culture is dependent upon the 
establishment of certain cultural norms within an organization. McKinsey notes that, “digital 
transformation is being driven from the top, personally mandated by the CEO” (Siebel).  There is data 
testifying to the influence of an organization’s culture on its ability to adopt technology; however, 
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organizational culture varies depending on the organization, institution, or author (Accenture; 
McKinsey; BCG Henderson Institute). McKinsey identifies “risk-taking, collaboration, and 
innovation” (McKinsey) as key indicators; whereas, Accenture in its “Boost You AIQ 
Transforming into an AI Business”, 2017 report, notes that a culture that prioritizes technology, 
data, and people is optimal. The specific characteristics of a AI-adoption conducive culture 
differs across reports, yet there is widespread consensus in the literature that organizational 
culture is a pivotal component of AI adoption.  
The reports pertaining to AI organizational adoption published by organizations, 
academic institutions, and research facilities indicate that there are identifiable characteristics of 
organizations that have been able to adopt AI. The characteristics are identified using data 
gathered from surveys of companies internationally. The specific strategies employed by these 
companies is not revealed in the reports, nor are the identities of the companies identified as 
“early adopters.” An analysis of the various metrics that the reports have identified indicate 
though that similar characteristics have been observed of companies who have adopted AI.  
In the report “Reshaping Business with Artificial Intelligence,” contributors affiliated 
with MIT Sloan school of Management and Deloitte, cite the following seven indicators of “AI 
pioneer” organizations: recognition of business use cases for AI, acquiring AI talent, senior 
executives leading AI initiatives, understanding of data and AI algorithms (robust data and 
analytics infrastructures), availability of data, developing internal skills through training, and 
established data privacy rules. Pioneer organizations rate their companies higher in several 
                                                
whether culture drives technology adoption or whether technology changes the culture is still an 
open question (McKinsey). Certain organizations or individuals perceive that, “culture leads the 
adoption of technology. Our ability to innovate depends on the impatience of our culture” 
(McKinsey); whereas the alternative view perceives technology as a means by which a firm can 
influence its culture.  
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general management and leadership areas: vision and leadership, openness and ability to change, 
long-term thinking, close alignment between business and technology strategy, and effective 
collaboration (Ransbotham, David Kiron, Philipp Gerbert, and Martin Reeves) 
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) similarly recognizes the characteristics identified by 
Ransbotham. In addition, in Artificial Intelligence: the next digital Frontier, MGI contributors 
identified size of the organization as an important component. The McKinsey report noted that 
the “early adopters” (organizations that McKinsey authors referred to as “leaders”) were the 
“Tech giants or digital natives” namely Amazon, Apple, Baidu, and Google (McKinsey). These 
organizations are investing billions of dollars in the various technologies known collectively as 
artificial intelligence; in addition, “tech giants” are most able to seize these AI as the necessary 
inputs are in place (powerful computer hardware, increasingly sophisticated algorithmic models, 
and a vast and fast-growing inventory of data). The report concludes that these tech giants are 
leaders in AI internal investment, and acquiring AI startups.  
In Boost Your AIQ (Artificial Intelligence Quotient), Accenture’s identifies three 
characteristics that distinguish organizations with the greatest AIQ. These organizations are 
“collaborative innovators” and use a combination of AI technologies, are using AI to transform 
their core business, are developing AI in-house (own AI-critical resources) and collaborate to 
share AI resources. Accenture differs from previous studies at is identifies specific strategies for 
organizations depending on their relative ages (i.e. their date of creation) and size; in this way, 
the strategies identified for incumbent organizations differ from those for new, or smaller 
“startup” organizations. 
Section III: A Contribution to the Literature 
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Section I of this literature review summarized the three primary antecedents of 
organizational innovation (environmental, managerial, and organizational), the various types of 
innovations (technological, non-technological), the two distinct adoption innovation processes 
(generation and adoption) and indicated that a comparative analysis of organizational innovation-
adoption is best conducted when size, sector, and organization type (private or public) are 
similar; Section II reviewed recent literature pertaining to organizational adoption of AI, and the 
antecedents observed by these specific management consultant companies that were reviewed 
are mostly consistent with the antecedents identified in organizational innovation adoption 
literature; however, a hierarchical antecedent relationship was identified as well as organizational 
characteristics of these antecedents. An intelligent or AI organizational transformation was the 
highest-level antecedent; this organizational transformation is preceded by a digital strategy, 
which is proceeded by organizational culture. Specific characteristics of the type of 
organizational culture that facilitates a successful digital strategy were identified, and these 
values can be influenced by an organization’s leadership.  
My research will expand the body of knowledge beyond the work completed thus far in 
the literature. A review of the literature indicated that national sociocultural values do influence 
organizational culture, and organizational culture is an antecedent of organizational adoption of 
innovation and adoption of AI. Further, according to recent literature, organizational culture is 
the hardest factor in organizational transformations (Bilefield, McKinsey & Company). Since 
national sociocultural values do differ and these differences influence the beliefs, attitudes, and 
behavior of people living in these countries, I aim to study the variation across national 
sociocultural values and its influence on organizational adoption of AI.  
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My goal is to offer insight on whether organizations operating in different nations within 
the same industry and size, adopt AI at different rates and whether national sociocultural values 
influenced organizational adoption of AI. To conduct this analysis, I identified two nations with 
distinct sociocultural values: France and the U.S. (Hofstede, 2001). I will quantify and 
subsequently compare the rate of organizational adoption of AI between French and U.S. 
organizations of comparable sizes, sectors, and type (private or public). The specific case-study 
approach that is used to measure AI adoption is explained in greater detail in the methodology 
section. This type of analysis will enable me to measure the relative “rates of adoption” of two 
firms in France and the U.S., and subsequently analyze if national culture variation influence 
organizational adoption of AI. 
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Chapter 3: The Influence of National Sociocultural Values on Organizational Adoption of 
Technology 
 
Section I: Chapter Overview 
 
According to Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, France and the U.S. have distinct 
sociocultural values; in this chapter, I summarize the national-level sociocultural values38 of 
France and the U.S. and analyze the influence of sociocultural values on organizational adoption 
of technology. I reference social psychologist Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 
2001) as a starting point, and combined additional literature, as well as testimonies, to cross-
check Hofstede’s cultural characteristics to assess the current national sociocultural values of 
France and the U.S.39 both nations. Two forms of “culture” are evaluated in this chapter 
(organizational culture and national-level sociocultural values); both forms of culture are 
relevant to my research as both types of culture are distinct and exist within an organization, and 
influence organizational adoption of technology, specifically artificial intelligence (AI).40 In 
                                                
38 I mention “primary” as the sociocultural values of France and the U.S. at a national level were 
identified by reviewing and subsequently combining the similar national-level values of these 
two countries from various academic sources. The sociocultural values that I identify for France 
and the U.S. represent my efforts to condense and summarize Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
(Hofstede 2001) as well additional sources. Second, I analyzed testimonies of French and 
American individuals to and assess the current sociocultural values of individuals in both 
nations. The sociocultural values that are examined do not represent an exhaustive list of all of 
the sociocultural characteristics of French and American individuals or of the national level 
sociocultural values of France of the U.S.  
39 This method of gathering testimonies is not an exhaustive assessment of French and American 
sociocultural values. Rather, these statements and testimonies are not representative of all French 
or all American people as they represent statements from a small sample size of individuals and 
were accessed from specific types of articles and publications. The primary purpose of including 
these testimonies was to cite examples of recent statements made by French and American 
individuals about their sociocultural values. Second, it was to cross-check Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions of France and the U.S. by researching and aggregating what actual individuals said 
about their sociocultural values.  
40 The national sociocultural values of France and the U.S. that are identified in the following 
sections were values that I identified after evaluating previous studies, data, articles, and 
testimonies. The values there are identified are generalizations based on the information that I 
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Section I of the literature review, previous research studies that evaluated the relationship 
between national values and organizational culture indicated that national values do influence 
organizational culture.41 This conclusion pertains to recent studies of organizational adoption AI 
because organizational culture is consistently acknowledged in current publications as an 
important driver of organizational adoption of AI. This relationship will be discussed in section 
two of this chapter. 
 
Section II: A Comparative Analysis of French and American National Sociocultural Values  
There is significant national-level data that indicates that people living in different 
nations operate with different values systems (Hofstede). Hofstede’s cultural dimensions model 
provide a systematic framework for assessing the differences between nations and cultures. 
There are six dimensions of this model; however, in this thesis I will only refer to five of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are the following: the uncertainty 
avoidance, the Power Distance, Individualism/Collectivism, Masculinity/Femininity, and Long 
Term Orientation/Short Term Orientation. A sixth dimension, Indulgence/Restraint, which was 
added by Hofstede in 2010, will not be discussed or referenced in this thesis due to a lack of 
research yet conducted on this topic. 
Power Distance Index: this dimension is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful 
members of organizations and institutions likely to submit to authority and accept and 
expect that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1994).  
                                                
could access and I acknowledge that they are my own generalizations. I was careful to minimize 
overgeneralizing or transposing my own biases when summarizing French and American 
national sociocultural values. To avoid these issues, I was careful to cross-check the information 
that I gathered with multiple references to more accurately determine these values.  
41 (Sabri, 2004) proposes that national culture influenced employee behavior within an 
organization, which subsequently influenced organizational culture. 
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Individualism/Collectivism: refers to a society comprised of people who perceive that the 
needs of individuals are more important relative to the needs of a group or organization. 
Societies that are characterized as individualistic value personal goals, whereas 
collectivist societies prioritize and value the goals of the group (Hofstede Insights).  
Masculinity/Femininity: refers to the extent to which values characterized as masculine 
such as competitiveness, and acquiring wealth are prioritized over feminine values such 
as quality of life and relationship building (Hofstede Insights). 
Uncertainty Avoidance: measures the general tendency of individuals in a society to 
accept or tolerate ambiguity or whether a society prefers rules, laws, and order (Hofstede 
Insights).  
Long-Term Orientation/Short Term Orientation: refers to a society’s attitude towards 
traditional values; long-term oriented cultures are more focused on the future, whereas 
short-term oriented cultures focus on the present and live on their daily routine by 
following their traditions (Hofstede Insights). 
When comparing the scores of France and the U.S., according to Hofstede’s five cultural 
dimensions, there are national-level sociocultural value differences. The U.S. scored higher in 
the individualism category, lower the power distance category, lower in the uncertainty 
avoidance category, and higher in the masculinity/femininity category. France’s scores were the 
following: Power Distance (68); Individualism/Collectivism (71); Uncertainty Avoidance (86) 
Long Term Orientation (39); Masculinity/Femininity (43) (Hofstede, 1980). The U.S. scores 
were the following: Power Distance (40); Individualism/Collectivism (91); Uncertainty 
Avoidance (46); Masculinity/Femininity (62) Long Term Orientation (26). (Hofstede, 1980) 
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National Sociocultural Values in France 
In this section I will evaluate France’s national level cultural values in the context of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. I combined Hofstede’s cultural analysis of France with recent 
testimonies of French individuals. I am assuming that these testimonies are representative of the 
average French individual. For the purposes of my analysis, I will assume that national-level 
sociocultural values of France prior to certain attitude and government-regulation shifts 
(discussed in the following section) are representative of the average French employee working 
in France. The cultural change that appears to be occurring in France seems to have been 
catalyzed by Macron’s governmental efforts starting in 2014; if such a national “rebranding 
effort” (New York Times) originated in 2014, it is unlikely that the culture biases of the majority 
of French people have changed (to a large degree) in the span of four years.42 
Uncertainty Avoidance: Hofstede’s cultural dimension “uncertainty avoidance” indicates 
that “structure, laws, and a propensity to save and invest” is representative of French 
cultural values France scored an 86 in uncertainty avoidance, indicating that France is 
identified as a society that prefers structure, in the form of laws, rules, and regulations 
                                                
42 (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue) concluded that cultural bias can be overcome by economic 
shocks, or institutional changes; however, these biases are overcome over a prolonged period of 
time, rather than a time period of four years (2014-2018). 
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(Hofstede Insights). A high score in this category demonstrates that French individuals 
prefer structure, and are less comfortable in unstructured situations or with ambiguity 
(Hofstede, 1994). A perceived discomfort with ambiguity or situations involving risks 
correlates with the tendency of French individuals to respect the status quo. French 
individuals appear to prefer job security, and stability, thereby minimizing ambiguity; 
situations or professions that involve greater risk-taking or possibly failure, may be less 
appealing to a French individual. In Why France is Taking a Lesson in Culture From 
Silicon Valley, “Failure is often stigmatized in French society—so much that the 
government started a campaign to persuade people that its O.K. to take risks” (Alderman, 
Morenne, Peltier). In addition, more than three quarters of French workers, “hold so-
called jobs for life and unions protest when businesses demand workplace flexibility” 
(Alderman, Morenne, Peltier). 
 
Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Orientation: France received a low score of thirty-
nine on this dimension, indicating that France is a “long term oriented” society; in this 
way, it is a pragmatic culture, and one that prefers to maintain traditions and “views 
societal change with suspicion” (Hofstede Insights).  
 
Masculinity/Femininity: France received a forty-three on this cultural dimension, 
indicating that it is a society that more closely embodies feminine characteristics such as 
cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life rather than masculine ones 
(achievement, heroism, assertiveness, or receiving material rewards) (Hofstede Insights). 
In addition, this score signifies that French society is consensus-oriented one. Specific 
types of professions seem to contradict with these values. France’s culture has 
historically been “at odds with an entrepreneurial drive” (Alderman, Morenne, Peltier). 
Brigitte Granville, a professor of economics at Queen Mary University of London, who 
was raised in France mentioned that, “When you grow up in France, none of the heroes 
you learn about are entrepreneurs,” and “when someone gets rich in France, people 
immediately ask, ‘What did he do to make this money? He must be a nasty person’” 
(Segal). 
 
Individualism/Collectivism: France’s high score in this category, called individualism, is 
defined as a preference for “closely knit social frameworks in which individuals are 
expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families” (Hofstede 
Insights). Given this mentality to uphold a financially stable lifestyle, it explains the 
negative perception of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs. Frédéris Mazzela, the co-
founder France’s successful startup BlaBlaCar, mentions that in France, “entrepreneurs 
used to be seen as people with nothing left to lose” (Alderman, Morenne, Peltier).  
 
Power Distance: France’s higher score in this dimension indicates that French society is 
accepting of expects that power is distributed unequally. Individuals in societies 
exhibiting a large degree of Power Distance “accept a hierarchical order in which 
everyone has a place and which needs no further justification” (Hofstede Insights). The 
New York Times indicated that, “France has long been known for its open hostility to 
corporations and its suspicion of personal wealth” (Segal). This suspicion to wealth may 
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have influenced cultural bias, parenting strategies, and subsequently the careers pursued 
by offspring of such parents (to work rather than entrepreneurship). 
 
The following section will review the influence that France’s institutions may have had the 
nation’s sociocultural values.  
 
Institutional influences on National French Sociocultural Values: 
Historically, France has embodied a welfare state43; this type of social-benefit-oriented 
economy may have dissuaded individuals in France from pursuing entrepreneurship as a result of 
cultural transmission from their parents (who were likely workers and passed on their 
occupational choice, creating future workers) (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue). France’s social 
welfare state is pertinent to this analysis in so far as this form of government influences the 
values, beliefs and attitudes of individuals living in France.  
There are definite benefits to a social welfare state; however, as it pertains to perceptions 
of risk taking, entrepreneurship, capitalism, and technological adoption, a welfare-state political 
system has had a significant influence. Origins of an anti-capitalist44 and anti-entrepreneurial45 
attitudes are usually traced back to the French Revolution, which, “elevated equality to a kind of 
                                                
43 According to the Merriam Webster dictionary, welfare state refers to a social system based 
where the nation’s political institutions assume primary responsibility for the individual 
and social welfare of its citizens. 
44 According to Oxford Dictionaries, anti-capitalist is defined as being opposed to capitalism. 
Capitalism is defined as “an economic system characterized by private or corporate 
ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and 
by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by 
competition in a free market.”  
45 Anti-entrepreneurial in this study refers to being opposed to entrepreneurship. According to 
Cambridge Dictionary, entrepreneurial and entrepreneurship are terms used to describe an 
individual who starts their own business; this decision to build a new organization involves an 
innovative ability to recognize new business opportunities and the willingness to take risks 
(Cambridge Dictionary). 
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religion” (Segal). François Hollande announced during his presidential campaign in 2012 that 
“My enemy is the world of finance,” he was summing up a sentiment that was representative of 
the average French citizen (Segal).  
 
An Evolving National Culture in France 
The cultural shift that is occurring in France (specifically with regards to evolving 
entrepreneurial and capitalist notions) relates to my research of organizational technological 
adoption because France’s reform policies and evident efforts to attract investment and business 
is impacting its culture. French growth, particularly in the deep tech sector is booming, and 
according to individuals involved in the entrepreneurial ecosystem in France, “there has been a 
huge shift in mindset” (The Economist, The Rise of Deep Tech is Boosting Paris’s startup 
scene). Graduates are particularly keen on startups in the “deep tech” sector—involving, among 
other things, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning and big data” (The Economist). If 
previously held cultural values are progressively dissipating or being overcome (possibly as a 
result of economic or political changes) then this shift may enable France to close the 
technological adoption gap.  
Though recent cultural changes may be occurring in France, the dominant characteristics 
of France’s national culture (risk-averse, anti-entrepreneurial, anti-capitalist) prior to these 
cultural shifts are likely representative of the average France citizen (discussed in Section III). 
The next section identifies three primary national sociocultural values of the U.S.  
 
National Sociocultural Values of the U.S. 
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When comparing the scores of France and the U.S., according to Hofstede’s five cultural 
dimensions, there are national-level sociocultural value differences. The U.S. scored higher in 
the individualism category, lower the power distance category, lower in the uncertainty 
avoidance category, and higher in the masculinity/femininity category. France’s scores were the 
following: Power Distance (68); Individualism/Collectivism (71); Uncertainty Avoidance (86) 
Long Term Orientation (39); Masculinity/Femininity (43)(Hofstede, 1980).. The U.S. scores were 
the following: Power Distance (40); Individualism/Collectivism (91); Uncertainty Avoidance 
(46); Masculinity/Femininity (62) Long Term Orientation (26). (Hofstede, 1980) 
Uncertainty Avoidance: The U.S. scores lower on uncertainty avoidance than France, receiving a 
score of forty-six. Societies that score lower in this category “maintain a more relaxed attitude in 
which practice counts more than principles” (Hofstede Insights); whereas countries exhibiting 
strong uncertainty avoidance prefer to maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior, and “are 
intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas” (Hofstede Insights). Americans are optimistic about 
the future, change and progress and are “less concerned with history and traditions than people 
from other societies” (UMSL). For this reason, Americans are very accepting of new ideas, 
innovative products and a “willingness to try something new or different,” whether it pertains to 
technology, business practices or food (Andrews). Positive beliefs about change are common in 
the U.S. and this manifests into a willingness to adapt, ideate, innovate and to pursue 
entrepreneurial46 pursuits (Andrews). 
 
Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Orientation: The U.S. scores lower on the long-term 
orientation category relative to France’s score. Americans are “prone to analyze new information 
to check whether it is true,” indicating that Americans are practical, and exhibit a “can-do 
mentality” (Hofstede Insights). Americans perceive organization, and productivity as extremely 
important and for this reason are less willing to engage in activities that do not have a “visible, 
beneficial outcome” (UMSL). 
 
Masculinity/Femininity: The U.S. scores a high score of sixty-two in this dimension, suggesting 
that it is a society that prefers achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for 
success. American society at large is more competitive. Achieving success is extremely 
important, which results in a competitive and desire to be “the best or the winner” (UMSL). In 
addition, those who achieve success (in the form of career pursuits) are viewed as highly 
respected individuals in American society.   
 
                                                
46The definition of entrepreneurial, according to Cambridge Dictionary, was given above when I 
defined anti-entrepreneurial.   
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Individualism/Collectivism: The U.S. scores high on this dimension, indicating that it is a 
society, similar to France, that prefers a “tight-knit framework in society” in which individuals 
are expected to be accountable for their relatives and loyal to them; for this reason, the 
propensity of Americans to view time as a resource may be a manifestation of this dimension. 
Americans are very intentional about using their time in the most efficient way possible.47 Since 
Americans view change and the future as a positive. Using one’s time in pursuit of success, 
results, or future oriented activities are viewed as “constructive” and respectable. Americans 
perceive organization, and productivity as extremely important and for this reason are less 
willing to engage in activities that do not have a “visible, beneficial outcome” (UMSL). 
 
Power Distance: Unlike France, the U.S. receives a low score on power distance; in this way, 
Americans are less willing to accept “inequalities among people.” In societies with low power 
distance, “people strive to equalize the distribution of power and demand justification for 
inequalities of power” (Hofstede Insights). Americans have a strong work ethic, believe that 
work is the basis of recognition (power), are driven to achieve results to earn recognition, and are 
highly competitive. Americans believe that people should “strive to be the best they can be,” and 
that they “live to work”; in this way, working hard to achieve professional success is important 
to obtain monetary rewards or other forms of public recognition and to improve one’s 
socioeconomic status.  
 
Section III: An Analysis of the Relationship between National Sociocultural Values and 
Technology Adoption 
The previous sections identified the differing national-level sociocultural values that exist 
in France compared with the U.S.; these sociocultural values influence behavior, shape belief 
systems, and impact attitudes of people (such as employees in organizations) (Sage 
Publications)48. This section of the chapter delves more deeply into how national culture shape 
                                                
47 A quotation that demonstrates the American view of “time” is “time is money” is the 
following: "You only get so much time in this life, so you'd better use it wisely." (UMSL) 
48 Sage publications in Describing Culture, aggregates research that has explored the 
contributing factors to cultural variation and persistence of variation. These factors include: 
climate, topography, indigenous economy; proximity and topography; economic systems and 
technology; political boundaries (Smith and Peterson, 1994) (Kluckhohn, C., & Strodtbeck, K. 
1961) (Adler 1997). Hofstede argues that nations are political entities and vary in their forms of 
government, legal system, educational systems, labor and employment relations systems; 
therefore, nations are unique social systems and therefore can have different cultures. (Hofstede 
1983)  
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the behavior, beliefs and attitudes of individuals which does influence an individual’s 
willingness to adopt technology.  
In Culture in Development, (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue), culture is proven to 
influence willingness of people to pursue entrepreneurship. The report explores how anti-
capitalist cultural bias, influences the values that parents instill in their children (such as risk 
aversion), adversely affects the supply or number of individuals pursuing entrepreneurship and 
risk-taking (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue). An anti-entrepreneurial bias effects the 
innovation and risk taking in a society, which results in too little entrepreneurship. This impact 
of stagnant entrepreneurship is that this may make “entrepreneurs unwilling to adopt productive 
technologies and adversely affect economic growth” (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue). 
In section I, France low uncertainty avoidance score indicated that French individuals on 
average, prefer structure, and rules rather than ambiguity; in this way, situations or professions 
that involve greater risk-taking or possibly failure, may be less appealing to a French individual. 
The U.S., however, received a higher uncertainty avoidance score and is identified as a culture 
that emphasizes individual success, results, and “winning”; Americans may view “taking risks” 
as a necessary, and justifiable pursuit to achieve success (they are more driven to achieve and 
thus risk-taking might be a necessary and value-added endeavor). In addition, beliefs (such as an 
aversion to entrepreneurship or perception of risk), attitudes and behaviors shaped by national 
cultures are slow to change (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue); which may explain why France 
is “lagging” in comparison to the U.S. with respect to innovation of AI and organizational 
adoption of AI. (Hofstede, 2001) noted that national cultural difference have been relatively 
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stable over time; while at the, “surface-level” there is some change with respect to the cultural 
habits and behaviors, “at a deeper level cultural differences persist” (Ghemawat, Reiche).49  
Culture effects an individual’s perception of risk and willingness to take risks; this 
culturally-influenced belief system, at the individual-level, is slower to change compared to 
political and economic institutions (Roland 2004). Transmission of culture by parents is thought 
to occur from two primary processes: the Beckerian approach, which focuses on within-family 
transmission (environment is a key influence on the development of skills and attitudes of 
children) or oblique (a child acquires the human capital through observation and imitation of a 
randomly matched working adult) (Bisin and Verdier). In both cases, the entrepreneurial culture 
breeds future entrepreneurs as both attitude towards risk and business expertise relative to labor 
productivity than a cultural lineage of wage workers. Though cultures and ancestral lineage of 
profession influences a child’s decision to become an entrepreneur, cultural biases (such as anti-
entrepreneurial perceptions) can be overcome large enough productivity shock (Chakraborty, 
Thompson, Yehoue). The cultural bias itself does not change, but the changing environment 
makes the bias easier to overcome. Roland’s (2004) model of cultural transmission indicates that 
the behavioral change that follows from the productivity shock occurs purely from economic 
change and rationality. In other words, culture at the individual level does not change—it is the 
same as before—but cultural behavior towards offspring does. In other words, the cultural bias of 
the parent does not change, but the changing environment makes the bias easier to overcome; in 
                                                
49 (Ghemawat, Reiche) noted that data for the World Value Survey, which is a study of sixty-five 
countries, indicated that a “remarkable resilience of distinctive cultural values even after taking 
into account the far-reaching cultural changes cause by modernization and economic 
development.” 
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this way, the child may hold different beliefs that his or her mother regarding entrepreneurship 
and risk taking.  
French and American sociocultural values do differ (discussed in Section I) and these 
differences influence the beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of people living in these countries; 
individuals in France are more risk averse and less entrepreneurially driven relative to the 
average American individual. These national sociocultural value differences may explain why AI 
innovation in the U.S. is greater than France (The Economist). If Americans are more commonly 
“risk takers” and entrepreneurial, these attitudes and beliefs may result in a greater willingness to 
adopt technology such as AI50 relative to individuals in France.51  
As it relates to this study, national cultural values do influence organizational culture, and 
organizational culture is a driving factor for organizational adoption of AI. An article published 
by Harvard Business Review compiled various definitions of organizational culture and these 
definitions consistently identified that organizational culture, “overlaps with other cultural 
values—especially the broader culture of the societies in which it operates” (Watkins). The next 
section will review the recent literature regarding the relationship of organizational culture and 
AI organizational adoption.  
 
Section IV: Influence of National Sociocultural Values on Organizational Culture 
                                                
50 However, (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue) note that cultural biases (beliefs) can be 
overcome by a large enough productivity shock (i.e. regulation change, or economic growth). 
51 This statement is an inference made by the author, based on the literature and multiple 
resources cited in the text. The relationship between national level values and individual 
willingness to adopt technology will not be explored in greater detail as the focus of this study 
pertains to organization-level analysis.  
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One core component of organizations adopting AI, specifically for large companies, is 
their organizational culture. In Reshaping Business with Artificial intelligence, Sam Ransbotham, 
David Kiron, Philipp Gerbert, and Martin Reeves note that, “the culture change required to 
implement AI will be daunting, according to several executives with whom [the authors] spoke.” 
In addition, a McKinsey report mentioned that, “[for organizations] to get the most out of AI in 
the long run, an organizational culture open to the collaboration of humans and machines is 
required;” in this way, an open, collaborative environment will facilitate employee trust, and 
simultaneously allow people, “to adjust to [the] paradigm shift [of adopting AI into the 
organization]” (McKinsey). Due to the interplay of training and inference in AI, and the 
relationship between a machine’s inner workings and the results it produces, creating an 
organizational culture that enables collaboration, communication, and risk-taking will help 
employees more quickly adopt to different working conditions that integrate AI (Accenture). In 
order for employees to be optimally equipped to adapt to AI, “the creation of an AI-ready culture 
should be a priority early on” (McKinsey). Francis Hintermann, the global managing director of 
Accenture Research noted that “…creating AI innovations requires incumbents to open up their 
technology, data, and talent to work with specialist startups and entrepreneurs. That requires 
them to transform their innovation strategies and organizational cultures.” 
To establish an organizational culture that is “AI-ready” Harvard Business Review notes 
that, “as with all cultural and organizational changes, leadership is critical” (Bughin, McCarthy, 
Chui). Strong leadership support goes hand in hand with stronger AI adoption. Respondents from 
firms that have successfully deployed an AI technology at scale tend to report executive support 
that is nearly twice as high as those from companies that have not adopted any AI technology 
(Bughin, McCarthy, Chui).  
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The importance of establishing of an “AI-ready” organizational culture is supported in 
the literature; however, the specific organizational cultural values or norms are loosely defined. 
Cultural values such as risk-taking (McKinsey), bold52 (HBR), collaborative (Accenture), and 
inventive(Accenture) are identified; these values are somewhat ambiguous though as “risk 
taking” could be embodied in many ways. The organizational cultures of organizations could be 
equally representative of risk taking in the context of the nation where the organization operates. 
For this reason, examining—in a direct sense—the interaction between national level cultural 
values and organizational cultural values requires data pertaining to the employee values and 
how these values are influenced when an organization’s culture shifts because of organizational 
adoption of AI. This data was not publically accessible. Therefore, this study will attempt to infer 
the influence of national level cultural values on organizational cultural values by quantifying the 
“rate of organizational adoption” of AI in France and the U.S. 
The insight provided by management consulting organizations pertaining to the 
importance of organizational culture on organizational AI-adoption coupled with existing 
literature on the relationship of national-level cultural values and organizational culture supports 
my hypothesis that organizational adoption of AI of French organizations will be slower (in a 
relative sense) then an American organization of the same size, sector, and type.53 My hypothesis 
and the methodology that I used to test my hypothesis is explained in the following chapter.  
                                                
52 Harvard Business Review’s “A Survey of 3,000 Executives Reveals How Businesses Succeed 
with AI” noted that being “bold” would enable organizations to adopt AI. Being “bold referred to 
adopting a strategy that radically adapts its portfolio of businesses and developing new business 
models to build a growth path. (Bughin, McCarthy, Chui).  
  
53 The level of homogeneity in employees’ perceptions and beliefs determines the “strength” of 
the organizational culture (the degree to which the dominant characteristics will be embodied by 
the organization); strong organizational cultures have high levels of homogeneity (Schneider, 
Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002; Erez & Gati 2004). National cultures of high individualism, low 
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Chapter 4: Hypothesis and Methodology 
Section I: Chapter Overview 
The methodology chapter will introduce how I propose to quantify, in an analytical sense, 
the rate of adoption (absorption) of AI in French versus U.S. organizations. I will articulate my 
hypothesis, identify and define the variables that I will be using to measure “relative rates of AI 
adoption” and introduce the organizations that I will be analyzing in my case study. The previous 
chapters provided the foundation for my hypothesis; after acknowledging my hypothesis I will 
summarize how the information, insight, and literature reviews can be aggregated to justify and 
legitimize my hypothesis. 
Research Question: How do national sociocultural values influence the rate of adoption 
(absorption) of AI in American versus French organizations?  
Research Objective: to quantify and subsequently compare the rate of organizational 
adoption of AI between French and U.S. organizations of comparable sizes, sectors, and type 
(private or public). 
                                                
uncertainty-avoidance and low power distance will adapt to organizational change more than 
their counterparts. When referencing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the U.S. scored higher in 
the individualism category, lower the power distance category, lower in the uncertainty 
avoidance category, and higher in the masculinity/femininity category.  
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Section II: My Hypothesis and its Underlying Logic 
Hypothesis: French high-tech multinational corporations will adopt AI technology at a 
slower rate than American high-tech multinational corporations.  
Table 1: Justification for My Hypothesis  
 
1. French vs American National- Level Sociocultural Values:  
I. National-Level Sociocultural Values in France: National sociocultural values of 
France and the U.S. do differ. The previous chapter compared Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension scores for France and the U.S., which reinforced that there exists 
sociocultural difference between the two nations. The following section will 
review the origins of France’s dominant national cultural values.  
2. Direct Relationship between National Sociocultural Values and Organizational 
Culture 
I. National-level sociocultural values do influence organizational culture of 
organizations: The national-level sociocultural values identified for France and 
the U.S. indicate that there exist sociocultural differences between the two 
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countries. In organizational management literature, firms are much more likely 
to adopt organizational cultures that align with the cultural values of the 
individuals or nation.54 The dominant characteristics of organizational culture’s 
that are optimally conducive to AI adoption include: risk-taking, adaptability, 
entrepreneurism, and collaboration.55 These values are more similar to 
American national-level cultural values; therefore, there will likely be a greater 
degree of homogeneity with regards to the beliefs and perceptions of American 
employees regarding risk taking, entrepreneurship, and adaptability to change, 
which will foster a greater capacity (relative to French firms) to adopt an 
organizational culture that is conducive to AI adoption.  
II. Implications of Sociocultural Values on Management Strategies of Firms: The 
different cultural characteristics of France and the U.S. that are identified by 
Hofstede are relevant as these cultural values influence organizational 
management strategies of firms (Noorderhaven, Harzing); therefore, it is 
inferred that French and American firms will differ in their management 
strategies. France and the U.S. differ with respect to values that relate to power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance, with France scoring higher on both 
                                                
54 National cultures of high individualism, low uncertainty-avoidance and low power distance 
will adapt to a global work environment more readily than their counterparts (the U.S scores 
higher in power distance and individualism then France). Global work environment is defined as 
the cultural values that are imposed by multinational organizations (Free markets, individualism, 
innovation, and change) (Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002; Erez & Gati 2004).  
55 In Chapter 3, Section IV of this thesis, I summarized the organizational cultural values that 
have been embodied by AI adopting organizations. These organizational cultural values are the 
following: risk-taking (McKinsey), bold55 (HBR), collaborative (Accenture), and 
inventive(Accenture). 
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dimensions. In the context of a firm, a large power distance, results in a 
centralized approach to management (Wong/Birnbaum-More (1994)). In 
addition, strong uncertainty avoidance is associated with strict control 
(Offermann/Hellmann 1997). In this way, the tendency of a French organization 
to exert stronger (relative to U.S. firms) influence on management-related issues 
within the firm is likely (Noorderhaven, Harzing). This is important as 
management strategies influence the organizational culture of a firm.  
3. Direct Relationship between Organizational Culture and Organizational Adoption 
of AI  
I. Organizational culture is important component of organizations adopting AI. 
Establishing or creating an organizational culture that is risk-taking, highly 
adaptive, and change-oriented better equips organizations to adopt AI (Bughin, 
McCarthy, Chui) (Accenture) (HBR). In Reshaping Business with Artificial 
Intelligence, Sam Ransbotham, David Kiron, Philipp Gerbert, and Martin 
Reeves note that, “the culture change required to implement AI will be 
daunting, according to several executives with whom [the authors] spoke.” In 
addition, a McKinsey report mentioned that, “[for organizations] to get the most 
out of AI in the long run, an organizational culture open to the collaboration of 
humans and machines is required.56 
                                                
56 AI Adoption versus AI Generation: The majority of research concerning AI organizational 
adoption combines generation (creation) and adoption (using externally developed AI) as an 
aggregate concept; in this way, the insight, analyses, and adoption the U.S. are conducive 
to organizational adoption (defined as the use of AI that is developed externally). I am interested 
in exploring this subtle yet important difference because generation versus adoption (simply 
integrating AI processes that were developed by other entities) is an organizational process that 
seems to require a different degree of organizational “adaptation and risk-taking.” Though 
55	
	
4. A Multinational Organization Does Embody the Cultural Values of its Nation of 
Origin 
I. MNCs “Bear the Imprint of their National Origins” (HBR): In The Myth of the 
Global Corporation, Paul Doremus concludes that multinational corporations 
do “bear the imprint of their national origins”; in other words, even though 
multinational corporations operate in a variety of locations globally, “every 
company carries the baggage of its home environment as it expands 
internationally” (Doremus). As it relates to my analysis, Doremus’s research is 
important as comparing the “relative rates of adoption” of two MNCs (one with 
France as its “home country” and one the U.S. as its “home country”) still 
permits a legitimate comparison of the influence of national sociocultural values 
on organizational adoption of AI. The authors noted that the “enormous 
differences” among different multinational companies was a result of the 
“unique political and economic characteristics of their home countries” 
(Doremus). In addition, with regards to corporate behavior, the authors provide 
convincing evidence that indicate that “nationality is destiny” (HBR).  
                                                
French cultural values may be less conducive to generation (innovating new forms of AI) as it 
requires a greater willingness to change, adoption (using existing AI applications) still seems to 
be an organizational venture that requires risk-taking. With the understanding that certain “AI 
early adopter” trends (with respect to industry and organization size) has been identified my case 
study approach will compare MNCs in the same sector (with origins in either France or the U.S.) 
to evaluate if organizational adoption of AI technology by these MNCs differs to the extent that 
the trends in the literature indicate.  
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The first goal of this thesis was to measure the rate of organizational adoption of AI by an 
American and French firm in the telecommunications industry. The second goal was to analyze 
whether national-level sociocultural values influence organizational adoption of AI.  
 
Section III: “The Ideal World” Methodology to Evaluate Organizational Adoption of AI 
In an ideal world, the optimal approach to comparatively quantify the “rate of 
organizational adoption of AI” would involve the following: aggregating a “portfolio” of all the 
forms of AI technology that each firm is utilizing internally and externally (in its products or 
services); distinguishing which forms of AI included in this “portfolio” were adopted (developed 
externally) or generated (developed internally) and by whom; and identifying all of the use cases 
or instances where the forms of AI that were adopted by the firm are being used. This data would 
provide the foundation for the ideal comparative case study approach, as it would be evident 
what forms of AI have been adopted within the organization and how the organization is 
utilizing the technology.  
The second component of this ideal method would involve accessing data pertaining to 
how the firm has integrated the externally-developed AI technology. For example, following an 
acquisition, what was the process and series of events within the firm (such as efforts made by 
the firm’s leadership team, employee sentiments, underlying business strategy articulated by the 
organization for integrating this externally-developed AI) that facilitated the firm to adopt this 
form of AI into its processes or products. An understanding of how each firm adopted externally-
developed forms of AI, will provide insight regarding the period (with respect to years) that was 
required to successfully adopt this technology; in this way, a conclusion of the “rate of 
organizational adoption of AI” will be possible. (For example, post-acquisition how long did it 
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take for the firm to adopt one form of AI technology of the acquired firm?) After identifying 
each firm’s “rate of organizational adoption of AI” a comparative analysis of these “rates” will 
be feasible.  
Identifying which forms of AI have been adopted by a firm, as well as the process, within 
the firm, that occurred to enable the firm to integrate this technology into its internal or external 
processes is the necessary information to answer accomplish the first goal of this thesis. The 
second goal of this thesis, would be optimally accomplished by gathering employee-specific data 
while each firm is in the process of adopting externally-developed forms of AI. One possible 
approach to collect this data would be in the form of an employee survey57. The structure of the 
questions included in the survey would likely differ depending on the focus of one’s study. In 
addition, the frequency of the surveys (how many rounds of surveys would be sent to the 
employees) would differ depending on the aim of the research. For my research, as quantifying 
the rate of organizational adoption of AI and the influence of sociocultural values on 
organizational adoption of AI are my primary goals, the questions as well as the frequency of 
surveys would relate to these goals. The questions that I would include in the survey would ask 
                                                
57Before developing this survey, the organization would have to allow this type of survey to be 
sent to its employees.  Surveys would be an optimal approach to accurately quantify the 
influence of individual-level sociocultural values because the survey responses would provide 
actual testimony from employees working at the organization. In addition, through the course of 
my research I realized that there were several levels of nested cultures within an organization, 
and an even more levels of culture within multinational organizations. Therefore, making a direct 
claim about the influence of individual-level sociocultural values on the capacity of an 
organization to adoption AI was an illegitimate claim. In this way, after reviewing the literature 
pertaining to levels of culture within an organization, and multinational organizations, I 
recognized that to offer insight that does not “overstate its findings” I want to acknowledge that 
the conclusions made from research are data-driven observation, however, there are many other 
factors and variables that influence organizational adoption of AI that intentionally chose to 
assume away for the purposes of my analysis.  
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the employees about his or her perceptions of the organization attempting to adopt externally-
developed forms of AI. The frequency of the surveys would enable me to quantify and evaluate 
whether employee sentiments evolve as the organization adopts the technology. I would send a 
survey prior to an acquisition, as well as post-integration of the AI technology of the acquired 
firm.  
This ideal methodology was not possible for me to accomplish for my thesis, as the 
necessary data and information was not accessible, nor was it possible to send employee surveys 
to obtain direct and credible information about employee sentiments or perceptions about the 
decision to adopt AI technology. However, identifying this approach was the result of the 
research that I did conduct, and the insight that I did gather in efforts to answer my research 
question. In other words, the value of my research was both the insight that I did uncover, as well 
as the identifying an optimal research methodology that could be employed in future studies that 
investigate the influence of sociocultural values and organizational adoption of AI.  
 
My Methodology 
Since this ideal methodology is outside of the scope of this research and is not able to be 
conducted, I will explore organizational adoption in a series of analyses to offer insight to the 
primary question motivating this research. The analyses that I conducted approximate (as closely 
as was feasible for me) the relative “rates of organizational adoption of AI” of French and 
American firms. My first analysis was to aggregate information accessible from internet sources 
about the AI-related investment by each Orange S.A. and Verizon. The weakness of this 
approach is that a comparison of AI investment is not perfectly indicative of the AI technology 
that has been effectively absorbed by the firms. The second analysis was my analytical case 
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study approach and my third analysis was an event study. In the following section, I will explain 
my choice for using each type of analysis and the strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
my research, as well as the practical constraints in my contest. 
Why an Analytical Case Study Approach? 
I used an analytical case study approach because I identified this method as being an 
optimal way (in terms of its feasibility and attainability) that I could uncover insight about the 
path and organizational decisions that resulted in adoption of a type of AI. The purpose of this 
method was to uncover insight about how organizations adopt AI technology, and evaluate if the 
adoption strategies of a French multinational organization and an American multinational 
organization were different, and if so, in what ways. In addition, I was interested to uncover 
sentiments of the members of the organizations regarding AI adoption, and their reasoning for 
these sentiments. My intention was to combine all the information I could uncover pertaining to 
organizational strategy, employee sentiments into an organizational adoption of AI narrative for 
both companies. This was my aim and my rationale for believing that uncovering this type of 
insight would be possible (before I completed my research) was a result of the large volume of 
AI-related organizational adoption articles, as well as data relating to organizational adoption 
studies completed by management consultant organizations.  
As I continued to learn more about organizational innovation and its two processes 
(adoption and generation) I realized that adoption referred strictly to the absorption of an 
organization of externally developed forms of AI; whereas, generation related to the efforts by an 
organization to create new and original forms of AI technology. This distinction had not been 
apparent in the initial phases of my research; therefore, when I was assessing whether an 
analytical case study approach would be feasible and one where data and information would be 
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available, I had believed that it would be because of the data that I had been able to access in the 
beginning phases of my research. However, once I continued to conduct my research and more 
carefully parse through the existing literature that related to my research, I recognized the 
difference between adoption and generation, as well as I recognized that combining articles, data, 
or information that related to organizational generation versus adoption of AI, to make a 
conclusion about the relative rates of adoption of a French organization and an American one 
would be an incorrect and illegitimate claim. The claim would have been deduced resulting from 
an inaccurate portrayal of data that related to two different innovation processes. In other words, 
the amount of data and information that I had originally intended to use as the backbone for my 
case study, was not representative of the actual amount of data that was relevant for my research 
or legitimate for my research. Once I began to parse through the data and accessible information 
relating to organizational adoption of AI, the amount of data, articles and information that I 
could obtain as an undergraduate student unaffiliated with these organizations was reduced 
considerably. In other words, the method that I had initially identified as a feasible approach 
(given the availability of data relating to organizational adoption/generation of AI) to quantify 
relative rates of organizational adoption of AI did not permit the type of analysis that I had 
originally perceived that I would be able to conduct. My primary aim was to offer research that 
accurately offered insight on organizational adoption; therefore, continuing to combine data that 
related to organizational generation and adoption of AI would not permit a credible study on 
organizational adoption. I was still motivated to understand the variation across national cultures 
in receptivity to organizational change, therefore I confined my research to strictly data 
pertaining to organizational adoption.  
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Gathering data that pertains specifically to organizational adoption of AI proved to be 
challenging, as the most accessible type of information relates to the organization’s AI 
generation efforts.58 Accessing information about internal (intra-organization) efforts to adopt AI 
was even more difficult (if Google is a researcher’s primary fact-finding tool) as internal 
organizational processes are less transparently communicated or explained via articles published 
online. Secondly, when I could retrieve articles that mentioned AI technology that was 
developed by a firm that Verizon or Orange S.A. had acquired, information relating to how the 
acquiring organization planned or had integrated (adopted) a specific forms of AI technology 
that it had acquired was not openly shared in these articles. For these reasons, my case study is a 
narrative on how and why (according to the articles that were accessible from Google) Orange 
S.A. and Verizon adopted AI chatbots. Chatbots are a type of AI technology that both 
organizations have sought to adopt in the form of products; in this way, there is information 
relating to the deployment and development (admittedly still a limited amount) of these chatbots. 
Analyzing the process by which each organization had adopted this type of AI technology is an 
opportunity for me to gather information relating to organizational adoption of AI and second, to 
compare these processes to evaluate if sociocultural values did influence organizational 
receptivity or capacity to adopt this technology.59 
                                                
58 According to an article published by Forbes, titled How Verizon is Building a Big Data and AI 
Culture, Verizon is building “a data-driven culture that leverages Big Data and AI capabilities.” 
Verizon has several analytics and AI groups that are incorporated into its businesses (Forbes).   
59 My case study analysis will focus on chatbots that were adopted by Orange S.A. or Verizon. In 
the case of Verizon, in May of 2017, it deployed a chatbot that was developed by its internal 
team (Verizon FIOS). This is an example of organizational generation of AI and therefore will 
not be included in my analysis. The chatbot that I will focus on will be the chatbot developed by 
Yahoo! that Verizon acquired in 2017 (Android Authority). 
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Section IV: An Explanation of My Actual Methodology 
Analytical Case Study Approach: I selected a qualitative case study approach for this 
research. The choice of the research method employed to conduct research ought to be grounded 
strongly on what is sought to be known; for this reason, the qualitative approach was the best 
method for this examination as it was consistent with my goals for this study. Qualitative seeks 
understand the underling qualities of entities and processes and their implicit meanings (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2000)60 and qualitative research enables exploration of a wide array of dimensions 
of the social world.61 Qualitative researchers stress the social constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied and the situational constraints 
that shape inquiry. Qualitative research see answers to questions that stress how social 
experience is created and given meaning. In contrast, quantitative studies emphasize the 
measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables, nor process. (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003) Quantitative research question usually resemble an interrogative sentence that 
asks a question about the relation that exists between two or more variables. Its purpose is to 
identify the variables being investigated and to specify the type of relationship, descriptive, 
                                                
60 Denzin and Lincoln suggest the following: "Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, 
involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret 
phenomena, in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the 
studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials... that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in individuals' lives."  
61 “Through qualitative research we can explore a wide array of dimensions of the social world, 
including the texture and weave of everyday life, the understandings, experiences and imaginings 
of our research participants, the ways that social processes, institutions, discourses or 
relationships work and the significance of the meanings that they generate”  
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predictive, or causal, being investigated. As it relates to the process of qualitative research, there 
is “not a clear cut sequence of procedures following a neat pattern, but a messy interaction 
between the conceptual and empirical world, deduction and induction at the same time (Bryman 
and Burgess, 1994).  
A case study is a common framework for conducting qualitative research (Stake, 2000). 
The purpose of using the case study is to get in-depth details as much as possible about an event, 
person or process; it is a research method that consists of investigation, collection of data over 
time, and detailed framing of the phenomena within specific contexts (Hartley, 2004). This 
method enable me to ask a “how” and “why” question regarding a specific event (Yin, 2003).  
There exist various types of case study approaches, and I selected a multiple case study 
approach. (Yin, 2014 found that a multiple case study approach is around two or more cases with 
similar issues. This method allows a researcher to select multiple cases from several different 
sites. Selection completed in this manner displays a range of perspectives on the issue. There are 
some advantages and disadvantages to various case studies. Multiple case studies allow for 
interviewing and documenting real life situations. Unlike single case studies, Yin (2014) found 
that multiple case studies are more robust in data analysis and as a result are more credible. 
Baxter and Jack (2008) explained that the case study method allows the exploration of the issue 
from different angles.  
When employing the case study methodology, researchers are encouraged to bind the 
case. The issue of binding the case, or explaining how the selected group, area or situation is 
legitimate is helpful with regards to putting parameters on the case. These parameters enable the 
type of focus needed to bring to light the issues that are at play within the case. (Baxter and Jack 
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2008) suggest three approaches to binding a case: time and place, time and activity, and by 
definition and context. The parameters that I used to bind my case studies are time and activity. I 
assessed organizational adoption of AI by evaluating one acquisition made by each organization, 
analyzing the same type of AI. Additionally, the size, sector, and type of organization were 
variables that were kept constant. 
In case study analyses, data collection is crucial as the choice of data collection 
determines the richness and depth of the insight that will be concluded from the case study. In 
case study, six major sources identified by researchers are the following: direct observation; 
interview; documents; archival records; physical artifacts and participant observation. One or all 
of the sources could be used depending on the relevance and nature of the case. (Yin, 1994; 
Stake, 1995; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). I used direct observation by analyzing web sources to 
conduct my case study analysis.  
Limitations of Case Studies: Case study research does have limitations. According to 
(Stake 2005), the interest and persistence of a researcher to uncover insight; in this way, “the 
ability to bring out the rich human attribute of the case study method is also strongly contingent 
on the researcher’s skill and thirst to do so.” I was persistent in the pursuit of acquiring access to 
different policies, procedures, and other material related to the investigation. I was successful in 
collecting the information, and this helped to increase the validity of the study, however there 
were limitations with regards to the data that I was able to access.  
A second possible limitation was the limited scope of the case study design. Yin (2014) 
argued that case studies had a limited range in application to other organizations. With only two 
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organizations participating, there is a limitation to the transferability of the results to other 
organizations.  
A possible third limitation of my research was my own personal bias.  For example, I am 
American and my sociocultural beliefs motivated this study. For this reason, I had to be careful 
not to transpose my personal experiences when analyzing the data. To avoid this issue, I tried to 
reference web sources published in France and in the U.S., in efforts to more accurately 
understand how each organization had adopted AI.  
Selecting Organizations for my Analytical Case Study: Chapter two summarized the three 
primary antecedents of organizational innovation (environmental, managerial, and 
organizational), the various types of innovations (technological, non-technological), the two 
distinct adoption innovation processes (generation and adoption) and indicated that a 
comparative analysis of organizational innovation-adoption is best conducted when size, sector, 
and organization type (private or public) are similar. To contribute to the literature on 
organizational adoption of AI, I selected two organizations that are in the same industry (high-
tech, telecommunications), size (measured by the number of employees), and type (multinational 
and public).62 The organizations that I selected were Verizon Communications (U.S.) and 
Orange S.A (France). Both organizations are public multinational telecommunications 
corporations63 and are of comparable size (measured by number of employees). This information 
is combined in Table 1.  
                                                
62 The specific characteristics of the organizations that I intentionally kept constant are identified 
in Table 1.  
63 Both multinational corporations are publically traded organizations. Verizon communications 
is traded on NYSE (VZ); Orange S.A. is traded on Euronext (ORA), NYSE (ORAN), BIT 
(ORA) (Reuters).  
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Measuring Organizational Adoption: Qualitatively Quantifying “Relative Rate of 
Adoption”: The existing literature on organizational innovation indicated that several 
characteristics of organizations must be considered when conducting research on organizational 
innovation to accurately conclude new insight on the subject (See chapter 2, Section I); for this 
reason, I carefully selected two organizations that were of comparable size, type, and industry. I 
selected two organizations in the high-tech sector, specifically the telecommunications industry, 
as organizations in this high-tech sector have been the most able to adopt AI compared to 
organizations in other industries.64 In addition, the literature on organizational innovation 
indicated that selecting organizations that are innovation-generating or innovation-adopting as 
well as identifying a common type of innovation permits a more accurate analysis; in the context 
of AI organizational adoption, most organizations are both generating and adopting the 
technology across sectors and are generating or adopting various types of AI. Though the 
organizations that I selected as my case study subjects are both generating and adopting AI 
technology, I focus solely on the efforts that both organizations have taken to adopt AI. Since I 
am interested in comparatively analyzing organizational adoption (as opposed to organizational 
generation) of these firms, I identified specific metrics that pertained to AI adoption (see Table 2 
                                                
64 As I reviewed the most recent literature on organizational adoption of AI, I found data that was 
presented at an Economics of AI conference in 2017. The data used in the presentations and were 
generated by McKinsey and indicated that the telecommunications industry was the industry that 
had adopted the most AI-related technologies at scale or in a core part of the business compared 
to organizations in other industries. The relevant table can be found on slide eleven of Market 
Structure and Competition by Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian.  
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in this chapter or Appendix A). I selected these metrics because adoption, in this research study, 
is the use of externally developed technology, therefore organizational activity that related to 
using new technology included: mergers, acquisitions, or investment in AI startups. This data 
was gathered from a variety of sources including: Crunchbase, CB Insights, Reuters, and the 
official websites of Verizon Wireless Communications and Orange S.A.  
The metrics were used to quantify organizational AI adoption to “set the stage” for the 
qualitative case study analysis that I will conduct. These metrics provided a way in which I could 
introduce Orange S.A. and Verizon Communications in the context of AI adoption. The 
conclusion drawn from this number-based analysis will serve as the introduction of Chapter 4. 
Following this introduction, which provides a AI-related technological background of both 
organizations, is a detailed qualitative analysis of one specific merger for each organization. The 
analysis and subsequent comparison of how each organization embodies (in a relative sense) the 
AI technology that they acquired from these mergers will enable me to offer insight and 
observations about the capacity of either organizations to adopt AI. The primary reason that the 
AI-related data in Table 2 serves only as the foundation for my analytical case study is that I 
cannot assume that an innovation has been adopted simply because the potential adopting 
organization was exposed (via a merger, acquisition, or investment) to that innovation. Rather, 
there are many instances where organizations have attempted to adopt innovation, (such as 
externally-developed technology), but their adoption efforts were unsuccessful and the 
organization was unable to absorb the innovation or technology.65 The sources that I referenced 
                                                
65 The GM and Toyota joint venture in 1980 testifies to the difficulty of separate firms to 
successfully adopt innovation of another organization. The merger between Toyota and GM was 
an optimal outcome, as GM benefitted from Toyota’s car-manufacturing strategy and Toyota, 
facing import restrictions from U.S. Congress, needed to establish a manufacturing branch in the 
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to find relevant information and data about Verizon Wireless Communications and Orange S.A. 
were from a variety of academic journals, articles published by Verizon Wireless 
Communications and Orange S.A., business magazines, international newspapers, and online 
publishing websites.  
Section V: Conclusion 
My objective of my analytical case study is to create a narrative of one U.S. (Verizon 
Wireless Communications) and one French (Orange S.A.) multinational firm in the 
telecommunications industry, to investigate how each organization has attempted to adopt AI. I 
will focus my analysis on an acquisition initiated by each organization in efforts to adopt AI to 
conduct this investigation. Instances when these organizations have merged, acquired, or pivoted 
(intentionally chosen a new direction for their business) will shed light on a broader question that 
is motivating this research: Do patterns of organizational AI adoption differ across large 
multinational firms operating in different countries? This question is a high-level one that is 
beyond the scope of my research study; however, the research question that this thesis aims to 
answer originated from this general question.  
                                                
U.S. The two firms launched their joint auto plant at a specific GM plant that was experiencing 
the greatest financial difficulty (Shook). The plant (renamed NUMMI) became tremendously 
successful and the primary reason was because the Toyota production and management systems 
had been effectively instituted at the U.S. plant. This positive joint venture incentivized GM to 
continue to “teach” the NUMMI business model to its other U.S. plants. GM’s efforts to institute 
NUMMI at other GM locations failed, however, despite the noticeable successful and efficiency 
gains that had occurred at the NUMMI plant. One of the major inhibiting factors that prevented 
adoption of technology and management strategies across the firms was a strong “lack of 
receptiveness to change” (Langfitt). People at other American GM plants did not believe that 
their branches would close and therefore were not “convinced that they did not need to change” 
(Langfitt).   
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The question that I aim to answer is the following: How do national sociocultural values 
influence the rate of adoption of AI in American versus French organizations? The analysis of 
adoption patterns of comparable multinational firms (one French and one American) will enable 
insight to be concluded that relates to this question. In Section I of this chapter my hypothesis as 
well as specific information legitimizing the hypothesis was summarized. This guided my 
methodology for my research which takes the form of an analytical case study approach.  
I believe that providing insight or to my research question is an attainable aim because of 
the connections that I have drawn regarding various types of research and existing literature (AI 
adoption, organizational innovation, and technological adoption) and the specific case study 
approach that I am will be using.  
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Chapter 5: Analytical Case Study 
 
This chapter will include two distinct comparative analyses of organizational adoption of 
AI; the first analysis (Section I) is a quantitative analysis, and the second is a qualitative analysis 
(Section 2). The first analysis addresses three specific metrics to quantify organizational 
adoption of AI by Verizon and Orange S.A. This analysis provides a foundation for my 
qualitative case study analysis (See Appendix A, Table 2 for relevant table that compiles the data 
presented in this chapter).  
 
Section I: Analysis of A Comparison of Organizational Investment in AI 
To conduct my quantitative case study, I researched Verizon and Orange S.A.’s venture 
capital arms66 and identified the number of AI-oriented startups that were included in the 
portfolios of the corporate venture capital arms of both organizations (See Appendix A, Table 2 
for the relevant table). Orange Digital Ventures, Orange S.A.’s venture capital arm, was founded 
                                                
66 Venture capital funds capitalized and run by major corporations are becoming more popular, 
and are commonly referred to as “venture capital arms” or “corporate venture arms.” In addition 
to Orange S.A. and Verizon, companies such 
as Google, Qualcomm, Comcast, Dell, Microsoft, Nokia, and Intel all have professional active 
venture arms. This is an important development for entrepreneurs and startups, as these corporate 
venture arms can invest significant capital and provide substantial assistance to a startup. 
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in 2015 and currently has fourteen startups67 in its investment portfolio. Of the fourteen startups 
that Orange Digital Ventures has invested in, four startups use AI technology (Followanalytics, 
Monzo, Secbi, Wevr). In comparison, Verizon’s venture capital arm, Verizon Ventures was 
founded in 2000 and has fifty-two startups in its portfolio. Twelve of the fifty-two portfolio 
startups use AI technology (8i, Otibus, Renovo, Sparkcognition, Urgent.ly, Vidrovr, Verdigris, 
Clip Call, Sfara, AdTheorent, Consert, Videosurf). In other words, AI-related startups occupy 
twenty-eight percent of the portfolio of Orange Ventures, and only twenty-three percent of 
Verizon Venture’s portfolio. A conclusion about the relative rate of organizational adoption 
based a comparison of the ratios of AI-related startups in these corporate venture capital arms is 
not indicative of AI adoption;68 however, it does provide useful information that testifies to the 
action both organizations have taken to invest in AI companies.  
 
Section II: Analysis of Retrospective Case-Study Narrative of AI Organizational Adoption 
The second analysis will take the form of a case study. This section is divided into two 
separate cases studies and each case study is a narrative on why and how (according to the 
articles that were accessible from Google) Orange S.A. and Verizon adopted AI chatbots69. In 
addition, I will briefly describe the company’s history, as well as explain how it has grown and 
                                                
67 According to Oxford Dictionaries a startup refers to a company or business enterprise that is 
newly established (Oxford Dictionaries).  
68 The companies included in these venture capital arm portfolios represent companies that 
Verizon Venture or Orange Digital Ventures have invested in; however, investment by these 
firms is neither representative of organizational adoption of AI by Verizon nor Orange S.A. 
69 According to Oxford Dictionaries, a chatbot is a program designed to simulate conversation 
with human users, especially over the internet (Oxford Dictionaries). Chatbots are fueled by AI 
and are a “viable customer service channel” (Hyken). Chatbots can recognize the content and 
context of customers’ requests and questions. For this reason, chatbots are one of the most 
popular AI applications used by telecommunications companies (Tech Emergence) (Oxford 
Dictionaries).  
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expanded, to provide additional background information about the company. An understanding 
of the historical context of both firms will provide useful context for my case study analysis70 
Verizon acquired chatbots that were generated by Yahoo71, whereas Orange S.A. 
integrated externally-developed AI technology to adopt a chatbot into its external product. In 
addition to analyzing the process by which chatbots were integrated by Orange S.A. and 
Verizon, I will also identify and evaluate an acquisition made by Orange S.A. and Verizon. 
Analyzing the process by which each organization adopted this type of AI technology is an 
opportunity for me to gather additional information relating to organizational adoption of AI and 
second, to compare each organization’s processes to evaluate if there is data indicating that 
sociocultural values do influence organizational receptivity to adopt AI. 
My case study analysis will focus on chatbots that were adopted by Orange S.A. or 
Verizon. In the case of Verizon, in May of 2017, it deployed a chatbot that was developed by its 
internal team (Verizon FIOS). This is an example of organizational generation of AI and 
therefore will not be the focus of this case study. The chatbot that I will focus on is the chatbot, 
known as “Captain”72, that was developed by Yahoo in 2017 and analyze how Verizon, since 
acquiring Yahoo in 2017 (Android Authority), has integrated this AI technology into its product.  
                                                
70Organizational adoption of innovation (such as technology) is influenced by external and 
internal factors. However, after assessing the current literature relating to organizational adoption 
of AI, I was not able to find evidence that indicated that there is a correlation or causal 
relationship between organizational adoption of AI and the historical background of a firm. For 
this reason, I only briefly summarize the events that resulted in the formation of Verizon and 
Orange S.A. 
71 Yahoo Inc or Yahoo! is a global internet provider web, founded in 1994, that was acquired by 
Verizon Communications in 2017. Yahoo! Provides users with online information, utilities, and 
access to other web sites. (Encyclopedia Britannica).  
72 Yahoo developed several other Chatbots prior to releasing “Captain”. In 2016, Yahoo 
launched its first three chatbots. They were launched on Kik Messenger and were intended for 
two of Yahoo’s most popular apps, Yahoo News Digest and Yahoo Weather (Olson).  
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A Case Study of Verizon Communications 
Verizon Communications is an American multinational telecommunications corporation, 
founded in 2000 as a result of a merger between GTE Corp and Atlantic Corp. The company has 
evolved since it was formed in 2000. It is a global technology company, provides 
communications, information and entertainment products and services to consumers, businesses 
and government agencies. It has two primary segments of business which include wireline and 
wireless (Reuters). The Wireless segment offers communications products and services, 
including wireless voice and data services and equipment sales, to consumer, business and 
government customers across the United States (Reuters). 
The mergers that formed Verizon involved companies “with roots that can be traced to 
the beginnings of the telephone business in the late 19th century” (Verizon). Throughout most of 
the 20th century, U.S. government regulation largely shaped the evolution of the 
telecommunications industry. A law enacted in 1996 (The Telecommunications Act) marked a 
large shift initiated by the U.S. government to promote “market-based policies” and create a new 
competitive marketplace. Verizon was formed shortly after industry-specific shifts occurred, 
catalyzed by U.S. public policy efforts. The merger between Bell Atlantic and GTE that created 
Verizon is among the largest mergers in U.S. history (Verizon). GTE and Bell Atlantic are both 
organizations that had grown through years of mergers, acquisitions and divestitures; in this way, 
each firm had proven track records in successfully integrating business operations. Since Verizon 
was created, the company has made several acquisitions to build its portfolio of communication 
services. In 2015, Verizon acquired AOL Inc. This acquisition symbolized the “next chapter in 
the company’s history,” (Verizon) as it publically broadcasted Verizon’s intentions to become a 
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global media technology company for creators, advertisers and consumers on a mobile-first 
network platform.73 
In June 2017 Verizon completed its acquisition of Yahoo and promptly “amalgamated it 
with its existing AOL business under a new subsidiary, Oath” (Shaikh). As it relates to adoption 
of AI, Verizon’s President of Media and Telematics noted that the acquisition was an important 
step towards growing Verizon’s digital media company. In addition, Verizon intends to combine 
“assets across Verizon and Oath, from VR to AI, 5G to IoT, from content partnerships to 
originals, which will create exciting new ways to captivate audiences across the globe” (Shaikh). 
Oath is the umbrella company of the Verizon’s digital content subdivisions, that integrates digital 
and mobile advertising with approximately fifty media and technology brands (Shaikh). The 
subsidiary’s portfolio includes HuffPost, Yahoo Sports, AOL.com, MAKERS, Tumblr, Flickr, 
BUILD Studios, Yahoo Finance, Yahoo Mail, as well as others (Shaikh). To most closely 
analyze how Verizon has adopted AI technology into its processes, I am focusing my analysis on 
Verizon’s subsidiary Oath, and evaluating whether Oath has been able to integrate Yahoo’s AI-
technology into its processes.   
 
Verizon’s Acquisition of Yahoo and Subsequent Formation of Oath 
Ronan Dunne, at the Oppenheimer 20th Annual Technology, Internet and 
Communications Conference in Boston in 2017, publically admitted that Verizon Wireless has 
                                                
73 For additional historical background on Verizon Wireless, several articles and reports are 
posted on the company’s website (www.Verizon.com).  
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“outlined a vision which will see the US operator broaden its traditional offering by leveraging 
artificial intelligence (AI) and transition into an information company (Mobile World Live).  
Dunne mentioned that Verizon is undergoing a transformation to be able to “offer superior 
connectivity and build experiences on top of that” (Mobile World Live) because he noted that 
“people don’t really buy technology, they buy the possibilities that technology gives them” 
(Mobile World Live). 
In 2017, Dunne mentioned that Verizon was proactively building on its infrastructure by 
broadening its offerings to provide more personalized solutions to its consumers. One example of 
this effort is Verizon’s acquisition of Yahoo, as the primary intention behind the acquisition was 
to enable Verizon to improve its “media and content offerings” (Mobile World Live).74 Verizon 
had shown interest in acquiring Yahoo! for several months before initiating an acquisition deal 
and had been investing heavily in digital advertising and media over the last several years; 
Verizon “believes that Yahoo’s infrastructure and substantial revenue in those markets could 
help it expand rapidly in that market” (Reisinger). Verizon acquired AOL in 2015 for similar 
reasons (Reisinger).  
Tim Armstrong, the appointed CEO of Oath mentioned that the goal of Oath is to “build 
the future of brands using a powerful technology, trusted content and differentiated data” 
(Williams). According to Armstrong, Verizon has “dominated consumer brands in news, sports, 
finance, tech, and entertainment and lifestyle coupled with [its] market-leading advertising 
technology platforms” (Shaikh). After the Yahoo merger, Verizon officially owned Yahoo’s 
internet assets which includes its deep portfolio of ad tech assets and digital properties. The “ad 
tech assets” that were explicitly mentioned that would be acquired by Oath were the following: 
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Yahoo’s web services (mail, news, sports content and financial tools), mobile applications and 
advertising technology for video and handheld devices (Womack) (Knutson and Seetharaman). 
Following the completion of the acquisition, the terms specified that the sale did include 
Yahoo’s cash, its shares in various companies, and several of Yahoo’s patents. The patents that 
were not included in the terms of the acquisition were those in the Excalibur portfolio (Lunden). 
However, according to TechCrunch, Verizon was provided with an indefinite license to use the 
estimated four thousand patents that comprise the Excalibur Portfolio (Lunden). 
The specific terms of Verizon’s acquisition agreement with Yahoo are particularly 
relevant as Yahoo, prior to being acquired by Verizon, developed and released a chatbot, known 
as Captain in 2017 (Statt). Captain was “designed to use some lightweight artificial intelligence 
to help family members manage each other’s busy schedules” (Statt). Captain is a type of task 
management service (Yeung), that enables users to streamline schedules and tasks by sending 
reminders to the user (Statt). The chatbot was initially SMS-based, and users communicated with 
Captain via text message; the chatbot was later launched on Facebook Messenger, and was one 
of the first third-party programs to integrate with Messenger’s chat extensions (Yeung). 
Following the acquisition of Yahoo, there is no mention of Captain or of a decision by Verizon 
to integrate the chatbot into its portfolio of AI products.75  
A Case Study of Orange S.A. 
Orange S.A. is a French multinational telecommunications corporation that was founded 
in 1988. It is one of the world’s leading telecommunications operators, with revenue of 40 billion 
                                                
75 Though Captain was not explicitly utilized by Verizon, Verizon released its own chatbot in 
May 2017, which was referred to its Fios chatbot. It is most likely that these chatbots were 
developed separately as the functionality of Verizon’s Fios chatbot was primarily focused on 
entertainment content (Android Authority) on Facebook Messenger.   
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euros. Most of Orange’s employees reside in France (97,000) and approximately 59,000 
employees work in offices worldwide (Reuters). The company is present in 28 countries, and has 
a customer base of 263 million customers76 (Orange).  
In 1988, Orange. S.A. (France Télécom) was a division of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. In 1990, France Télécom became an operator of public law, and then it 
was privatized by Presiden Lionel Jospin in 1998. The French government owned a twenty-seven 
percent stake in the company and the French government, specifically the Conseil of Ministers 
appointed Michel Bon as the CEO of France Telecom Group. In 2000, France Telecom bought 
Orange from a British multinational communications company, Vodafone, and acquired stakes in 
several other international firms. Following these acquisitions, France Télécom became the 
fourth largest telecommunications operator in the world. Orange’s mobile telephone operations 
were merged with the mobile operations of France Télécom, forming the new group Orange SA. 
In 2001, Orange SA was listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange, and later that year was 
listed on the CAC 40.77 In 2002, the company’s stock price suffered and received a debt 
adjustment by the French state, since it was still a majority stakeholder. Beginning in 2006, the 
company initiated a rebranding effort, and Orange Business Services became the brand for all of 
the company’s business service offerings worldwide. As of 2015, the major shareholders of 
Orange include: the French government (15.08%), and the public float (84.92%).  
                                                
76 For additional historical background on Orange S.A., several articles and reports are posted on 
the company’s official website (www.Orange.com).     
 
77 The CAC 40 is a French stock market index. The index represents a market capitalization-
weighted measured of the 40 most significant values among the 100 highest market caps on the 
Euronext Paris (EuroNext). 
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In 2016, CEO of Orange S.A., Stephane Richard, stated that Orange S.A. would be 
expanding into a new market (Agnew). Mr. Richard explained that the company’s expansion was 
motivated by the stagnant growth in the French telecommunications industry and several failed 
consolidation efforts by Orange S.A. to merge with other players in the industry. Mr. Richard, 
announced that Orange S.A. will “bank on another industry to boost earnings: financial services” 
(Agnew).  
To initiate this organizational pivot, Orange S.A. acquired a sixty-five percent share in 
Groupama Banque78 in April 2016. According to Stephane Richard, buying a majority stake in 
Groupama Banque signified “a major step forward in [Orange’s] ambition to diversify into 
mobile financial services” (Thomson). Following this acquisition, Orange and Groupama Banque 
signed an agreement to develop a mobile banking service (Groupama). The resources of the two 
companies were combined to launch Orange Bank in 2017. This banking service was specifically 
designed for mobile usage in France. Orange Bank is marketed under both the Orange brand and 
Groupama brand, using each organization’s respective distribution networks (Groupama).  
Orange S.A.’s acquisition of Groupama Banque signified the first step to Orange S.A. 
adopting AI. The acquisition of Groupama Banque allowed Orange S.A. to enter the mobile 
finance market, and launch its mobile banking service Orange Bank. Orange S.A. was able to 
take advantage of Groupama’s banking expertise, and integrate it with Orange S.A.’s existing 
assets to develop an innovative, mobile banking service, “that aims to bring mobile banking into 
                                                
78 Groupama Banque is a mutual insurance company in France. It is a leading player in the 
French insurance industry, ranked as the nation’s top provider of individual health insurance, and 
insurance for farmers and local authorities. The company is active in 11 countries and operates in 
insurance, services, as well as financial and banking businesses. Following the acquisition by 
Orange S.A., Groupama Banque will continue to own the remaining thirty-five percent of the 
company (Groupama). 
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a new dimension” (Groupama)(Davies). Orange S.A. mobile banking service is innovative as it 
is specifically “designed for the mobile world” (Davies).  
The CEO of Orange Bank, André Coisne, was committed to integrating AI into Orange 
S.A.’s mobile banking service.79 Orange S.A. integrated AI technology in the form of a chatbot 
into its mobile banking services to ensure that the inquiries of its users are immediately 
addressed (Davies). Orange S.A. adopted AI technology in this case, as Orange S.A. partnered 
with IBM to provide an AI-powered Watson80-based virtual assistant.81 The chatbot is powered 
by IBM’s Watson’s technology; it answers questions, detects emotion, and analyzes the specific 
user inquiry using Watson’s sentiment analysis APIs. In addition, the chatbot acts as a financial 
advisor; it can forecast a user’s future expenditures based on previous spending habits, using 
machine learning APIs (Davies).  
After analyzing Orange S.A.’s process for adopting its customer support chatbot for its 
mobile banking services, it is evident that Orange S.A. proactively attempted to adopt AI. 
However, based on the information that was accessible on the internet, the primary motivating 
factor behind Orange S.A.’s acquisition of Groupama Banque was entering the mobile banking 
industry; however, testimony from the Orange S.A.’s leadership team, supporting investment in 
                                                
79 André Coisne mentioned that « Orange Banque est un système qui s’appuiera surtout sur le 
système d’intelligence artificielle IBM Watson » (Ercolani). Orange bank will use IBM’s AI 
capabilities.    
80 Watson is IBM’s version of artificial intelligence. It was created in 2014 and IBM invested in 
Watson with the intention of enabling companies to apply AI techniques more easily. IBM’s 
Watson has been utilized for a variety of purposes, and across industries (Lohr). 
81 Since this chatbot was developed using IBM’s AI technology, I am concluding that it is most 
accurately categorized an example of organizational adoption of AI. This conclusion is based on 
information gathered from several web sources. Watson designed the AI technology, and Orange 
is using this technology to for its own banking services. (« Watson désigne en effet un 
programme d'intelligence artificielle conçu par l'Américain IBM, dont Orange va notamment se 
servir pour le lancement de sa banque mobile, Orange Bank » )(Europe 1) 
80	
	
AI, as well as the Watson-based chatbot that Orange S.A. released in 2017 and integrated into its 
mobile banking services indicate that a motivating factor for Orange S.A.’s acquisition of 
Groupama might have been to adopt AI technology (Dillet). If Orange S.A.’s leadership team 
identified that mobile banking industry was a feasible industry to enter, as well as a viable 
industry to take advantage of AI (in the form of a chatbot), Groupama’s acquisition may have 
been the first step of Orange S.A.’s adoption of AI technology.   
This case study analysis did indicate that Orange S.A.’s leadership team is commitment 
to integrating AI into its processes, and particularly into its mobile banking service. The CEO of 
Orange S.A., Stephane Richard, admitted that the future is AI (l’avenir c’est L’IA) (Cuny). 
Richard’s testimony indicated that he was optimistic and eager to integrate AI into Orange 
Bank’s products. He mentioned that AI will permit better customer experiences as AI permits 
customers to have access to 24/7 customer service82(Pontiroli and Rochegonde).  
In addition, Orange S.A. has continued to integrate AI into its processes. Orange S.A. 
announced its virtual assistant, named Djingo, in 2017. I characterized Djingo as an example of 
organizational generation of AI, therefore I did not include it in my case study analysis. The 
virtual assistant was developed by Orange in collaboration with Deutsche Telekom and will 
allow Orange customers to control Orange TV, manage connected objects, or make a phone call 
                                                
82 This testimony by Stephane Richard was translated from an article published in Stratégie. 
Richard’s response in French is the following : « Notre conviction est que l’IA ne va pas 
apporter la réponse à tout et supplanter complètement l’homme, mais elle va changer pas mal de 
choses dans la relation client. Il faut se demander ce qu’attendent les gens. D’abord, un service 
24 h sur 24, 7 jours sur 7 et 365 jours par an. Quand vous avez besoin d’aller dans une agence 
mais qu'elle est fermée le dimanche et le lundi, ou que vous faites une opération le samedi et 
qu’il faut attendre le mardi pour avoir une trace… tout cela est complètement dépassé. Cela 
insupporte les gens. Sans parler des dates de valeur, etc. La disponibilité du service client est 
quelque chose de majeur. Et la seule façon d’assurer cette disponibilité, c’est l’IA. Un robot ne 
dort jamais ! » (Pontiroli and Rochegonde). 
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or send a text message. It incorporates AI and therefore can “provide increasingly relevant 
answers to user inquiries and requests”.  
Section III: Conclusions from the Case Studies 
The analytical case studies of Verizon and Orange S.A. indicated that both multinational 
telecommunications corporations are integrating AI, specifically chatbots;83 however, 
quantifying the rate of adoption of AI84 of Verizon or Orange S.A. was not possible because of 
the limitations of my methodology. Information gathered from various internet sources proved 
that both companies are adopting or generating chatbots into their products. According to several 
web sources, Verizon and Orange S.A. are generating chabots (Verizon’s Fios chatbot, and 
Orange S.A.’s Djingo).85 The information aggregated from online sources did not permit me to 
accurately distinguish whether the chatbots were adopted or generated, preventing a conclusion 
to be drawn about the rate of AI adoption of either organization; in this way, it is difficult to infer 
if variation in national sociocultural values in France or in the U.S. (identified in Chapter 4) are 
influencing the ability of Verizon or Orange S.A. to adopt AI technology. However, I am able to 
approximate the rate of adoption of each firm, as well as compare the testimonies of the CEO’s 
of Verizon and Orange S.A., analyzing if differences in sociocultural values are evident from 
their testimonies. 
                                                
83 I acknowledge that Verizon and Orange S.A. are using and generating additional types of AI 
technology, in addition to the chatbot. For the purposes of this thesis, I have focused only on 
analyzing chatbots.  
84 It is assumed in this thesis that AI technology refers to only to chatbots. 
85 This inference is based on information gathered from various web sources accessible via 
Google; however, I am not able to definitively state that Verizon or Orange S.A. are generating 
AI technology. According to various web sources, both organizations are developing chatbots 
and if these chatbots are being developed internally (within the organization), then they are 
examples of organizational generation of AI.   
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A conclusion about the rate of organizational adoption of AI was unable to be made, 
given the limitations of my methodology; however, my qualitative case study did permit me to 
make observational claims about how and why Verizon and Orange S.A. adopted AI technology. 
In the case of Verizon, I analyzed the acquisition of Yahoo and evaluated the terms of the 
acquisition, and the articles published following the merger to examine whether Yahoo’s chatbot, 
Captain, had been adopted by Verizon. According to several internet sources that were accessible 
via Google searches,86 Captain was not mentioned, nor was there information indicating that the 
AI technology of this chatbot had been used by Verizon for other products. In this way, it 
appears that Verizon was not able to adopt the AI chatbot technology that it acquired from 
Yahoo.87 Adopting chatbot technology may not have been Verizon’s primary motivation for 
acquiring Yahoo; however, for the purposes of my analysis, Verizon’s inability to adopt this 
technology after acquiring Yahoo is pertinent to my analysis. Unlike Verizon, Orange S.A. 
acquired Groupama Banque in 2016 and adopted an AI-powered Watson-based chatbot in 2017 
for its mobile banking services. Orange S.A. did successfully adopt AI technology, in the form of 
a chatbot. This example contrasts with Verizon and Yahoo’s chatbot, Captain, because Orange 
S.A. did not absorb its customer service chatbot as a result of its merger with Groupama 
                                                
86 The internet sources that I referenced to evaluate how and why Verizon and Orange S.A. 
adopted AI chatbots were the following online resources: Market Watch, Forbes, Orange 
S.A.com official website, Verizon.com, Financial Times, Groupama.com, europe1.fr, 
androidauthority.com, eweek, martechseries.com, theverge.com, livemint.com, Wall Street 
Journal, venturebeat.com, and mobileworldlive.com. I acknowledge that certain sources among 
this list of references are not categorized as scholarly sources; for this reason, I intentionally 
attempted to verify the information I found from the websites included in this list, with articles 
and information accessible on Verizon and Orange S.A.’s official company website.  
87 Though certain terms pertaining to the acquisition agreement between Verizon and Yahoo 
were accessible from various web sources, it is not possible for me to conclude with complete 
certainty that Yahoo’s Captain or the chatbot’s AI technology was either included or not 
included in the agreement.  
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Banque;88 instead Orange S.A. adopted this technology from a third organization (IBM). Verizon 
and Orange S.A. employed different approaches to adopt AI technology. Verizon was unable to 
adopt Yahoo’s AI chatbot technology, whereas Orange S.A. sought a new market and adopted 
AI chatbot technology after entering the mobile banking services market.   
It is possible to approximate the rate of organizational adoption, given the information 
that I was able to access; Verizon acquired Yahoo in June, 2017 after several months of showing 
interest in acquiring the company. Two months before closing the deal for Yahoo, Verizon 
announced that it would place Yahoo and AOL under the Oath umbrella; immediately following 
the Yahoo acquisition, Oath was launched (Spangler) (Goel). According various web sources, it 
is not able to be determined if Oath was able to adopt the chatbot technology that it acquired 
from Yahoo.  
In comparison, Orange S.A. acquired a majority stake in Groupama Banque89 in April 
2016. The acquisition signified a strategic partnership between the two companies. Groupama 
Banque was renamed Orange Bank on January 16, 2017 (Groupama). Following the partnership, 
Orange Bank officially launched in May 2017; in addition to the launch of Orange Bank, the 
IBM AI Watson-based chatbot assistant was introduced. With regards to the rate of adoption, 
Verizon’s Oath was unable to adopt the chatbot technology of Yahoo; Orange S.A.’s was able to 
                                                
88 Groupama Banque did not have an AI chatbot at the time that Orange S.A. bought a sixty-five 
percent stake in the company in 2016 (Groupama). For this reason, it was not possible to analyze 
how Orange S.A. adopted AI technology from Groupama Banque.  
89 Groupama Banque is a mutual insurance company in France. It is a leading player in the 
French insurance industry, ranked as the nation’s top provider of individual health insurance, and 
insurance for farmers and local authorities. The company is active in 11 countries and operates in 
insurance, services, as well as financial and banking businesses. Following the acquisition by 
Orange S.A., Groupama Banque will continue to own the remaining thirty-five percent of the 
company (Groupama). 
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adopt IBM’s AI technology following its acquisition and subsequent strategic partnership with 
Groupama Banque.  
The influence of national sociocultural values on the capacity of Verizon and Orange 
S.A.’s willingness to adopt AI technology is difficult to determine from the information that was 
accessible via web sources; in this way, I am not able to reject nor accept my hypothesis that was 
articulated in chapter four. It was possible, however, to offer observations regarding the 
testimonies of individuals who hold leadership positions at Verizon or Orange S.A. and analyze 
if sociocultural value differences contribute to differing viewpoints. The testimonies of Ronan 
Dunne (Executive Vice President of Verizon), Stephane Richard (CEO of Orange S.A.) and 
André Coisne (CEO of Orange Bank) indicate that these individuals share similar views 
regarding the importance of integrating AI technology into their business (Verizon.com).90 
A positive perception and acknowledgment of the importance of being open to technological 
change, willing to use and generate AI, and seek to offer products or services that are beneficial 
to users and differentiated from other products was similarly articulated by individuals working 
at both companies91 (Ha).  
 
 
                                                
90 Testimonies from Verizon’s CEO, Lowell C. McAdam, or Tim Armstrong (CEO of Oath) 
were not able to be found using Google. 
91 Tim Armstrong mentioned that, “the skill set of differentiation is going to be one of the most 
important skill sets in the future of corporations because of how pervasive technology is” (Ha). 
Richard mentioned that “Innovating means choosing; choosing when to disrupt,” said CEO 
Stephane Richard, at Show Hello, the company’s annual innovation showcase. “We must ask 
ourselves two questions. Firstly, will this innovation be useful to the person; this question is 
about purpose. The second question is about whether people can actually use it. This is about 
access. This approach to innovation is called Human Insight” (Davies). Ronan Dunne’s 
testimony about the importance of AI is included earlier in this chapter, in the Verizon case 
study.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
Section I: Conclusions of Research 
 
My motivating interest for my thesis was the variation across national cultures and its 
influence on organizational adoption of technology. The goal of this research was to offer insight 
on whether organizations operating in different nations within the same industry adopt AI at 
different rates and whether national sociocultural values influenced organizational adoption of 
AI. The limitations of my methodology prevented me from conclusively offering insight on this 
subject; for this reason, making a definitive claim about the relative rates of organizational 
adoption of AI of organizations in the U.S. and France would be an unsupported one. Research 
uncovers gaps, and though a conclusion about organizational adoption of AI was not feasible 
with my chosen methodological approach, my research contributes to future research.  
My thesis illuminated why such a study warranted investigation and how this research applies to 
future studies on the following subjects: organizational adoption of technology, organizational 
adoption of AI, organizational and generation of AI. In addition, this research contributes to the 
following higher-level concepts: organizational change, technological change, and economic 
growth.  
Though I was not able to make a definitive claim about the relative rates of 
organizational adoption of AI of organizations in the U.S. and France, my hypothesis stemmed 
from conclusions that I was able to make, supported by data and previous literature. The main 
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conclusion of this thesis is that national cultural values may predispose nations (and the 
organizations operating in those nations) to be more equipped to adapt to technological change, 
and therefore able to integrate AI. This conclusion was derived from the information I gathered 
from the literature and cited as the support for my hypothesis.92 A second conclusion was that 
there was evidence that suggested that certain economic pressures,93 do cause individual-level 
cultural values to evolve or shift. These two conclusions supported by data, research, and 
previous studies is why I believe that the further research that focuses on studying the influence 
of cultural values on organizational adoption of technology is warranted 
My research contributes insight that is relevant for organizations today and in the future. 
Businesses today are facing incredible pressure to adapt and transform as a period of “tectonic 
change in the business world has begun, brought on by technological progress” (Brnjolfsson and 
McAfee). For over 250 years, technological innovations have been recognized as the primary 
drivers of economic growth. Technologies known as general-purpose technologies94 have been 
recognized as the most important, as these technologies “catalyzed waves of complementary 
                                                
92 In Chapter 4, I summarized how the information, insight, and literature reviews could be 
aggregated to justify and legitimize my hypothesis. I identified four main conclusions to do so. 
These conclusions are the following:  1) National Values differ in France and the U.S., 2) 
National level Sociocultural Values Influence Organizational Culture, 3) Organizational Culture 
influences Organizational adoption of AI, 4) Multinational Organizations are influenced by its 
country of origin. 
93 (Chakraborty, Thompson, Yehoue) concluded that cultural bias can be overcome by economic 
shocks, or institutional changes; however, these biases are overcome over a prolonged period, 
rather than period of four years (2014-2018). This study is by no means an exhaustive study on 
factors that influence individual-level cultural change; however, it did indicate that cultural 
values do change over time.  
94 According to Erik Brnjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, in The Business of Artificial Intelligence, 
general-purpose technologies in previous eras were the following technologies: steam engine, 
electricity, and internal combustion engine. These technologies are important drivers of 
technological innovations.  
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innovations and opportunities” (Brnjolfsson and McAfee). Artificial intelligence is widely 
recognized as the most important general-purpose technology of our era (Brnjolfsson and 
McAfee). As it relates to businesses, AI is estimated to have a significant impact. AI is already 
integrated into thousands of organizations worldwide; however, “most big opportunities have not 
yet been tapped” (Brnjolfsson and McAfee). Artificial intelligence, specifically machine 
learning, is driving changes at three levels of organizations: tasks and occupations, business 
processes, and business models. The effects of AI will be magnified in the coming decade as 
“virtually every industry” transforms its core processes and business models to take advantage of 
AI. The bottleneck now is in management, implementation, and business imagination 
(Brnjolfsson and McAfee).  
The fact that a “bottleneck” exists indicates that organizational adoption and generation 
of AI is challenging for organizations worldwide. However, this bottleneck is not representative 
of the amount of organizations attempting to adopt AI; a study conducted by MIT’s Sloan 
Management Review and The Boston Consulting Group, indicated that there are significant gaps 
with respect to organizations interest to adopt AI and their ability to do so (Ransotham, Kiron, 
Gerbert, Reeves). This research suggests that a large percentage of organizations acknowledge 
that adopting AI is a competitive advantage. In this way, future research that can identify the 
origins of the main challenges that organizations face in this process of adopting AI will be 
important. This information will better inform and subsequently more effectively equip 
organizations with strategies to integrate AI into their business processes.  
 
A Need for a Common Definition of Adoption 
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To optimize the information and insight that will be obtained by future researchers 
regarding organizational adoption of AI, I believe that an important first step is to establish and 
define a single definition of the following terms: AI adopting organizations, AI adoption and AI 
generation. As I have mentioned in early chapters of this thesis, significant and valuable research 
has been conducted by management consulting firms, academic researchers, and other research 
organizations on organizational adoption of AI; however, in these studies, the term “adoption” is 
used to reference two types organizational innovation processes: adoption and generation. For 
example, terms such as “pioneer AI adopters” or “AI adopting organizations” have been used, 
and when assessing the insight gathered from research that combines adoption and generation, it 
is difficult to conclude the specific strategy that the organization utilized to incorporate AI into 
its business processes. To gain a deeper understanding of how organizations have integrated AI 
into their processes and minimize confusion, distinguishing between businesses that have utilized 
adoption (used externally developed AI technology) or generation (developed the AI technology 
internally) is crucial. Most importantly, since the organizations that are characterized as “leading 
the race for AI” (The Economist) such as Google, Amazon, and various others, distinguishing 
between the innovation processes that these organizations have used would be beneficial, as it 
would enable more specific insight to be gathered.  
 
Section II: Opportunities for Future Research 
Future studies will largely be dependent upon the answers that researchers wish to obtain 
about organizational adoption of AI and the problems that they wish to solve with their research. 
The research that I conducted for this thesis reinforced to me that there are incredibly interesting 
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questions (that remain unanswered) that relate to organizational adoption of AI, as well as what 
future research on this subject, in my opinion, warrants priority.   
As I mentioned, the answer or identified problem should drive the research; in this way, 
there are three types of future research paths that I have identified and would encourage. One 
overarching question that I believe is important to organizations today, given the current gaps in 
organizational adoption across industries and nations, is the following: What is the most viable 
strategy to integrate technology into organizational processes? The three future avenues of 
research that I have identified are separate methodological approaches that would aim to expand 
on this relationship in the context of organizational adoption of AI. They are explained in 
descending order, according to priority.   
1. Analyzing Organizational Generation of AI by Evaluating Organizational Efforts to 
Integrate Machine Learning into HR Analytics  
My motivating higher-level question seeks to identify a viable strategy to integrate AI 
into organizational processes; to answer to this question, one possible area of research would 
focus on organizational generation of a specific type of AI, such as machine learning,95 and 
evaluate how machine learning has been generated in a specific department within an 
organization (human resources). Focusing on organizational generation of machine learning in 
HR-related processes would narrow one’s scope of research. More importantly, it would enable 
insight to be extracted about whether developing machine learning applications intended to 
                                                
95 Machine Learning is the type of AI that is recognized as being the most important general-
purpose technology of the current era (Brnjolfsson and McAfee). Machine learning is defined as 
the field of computer science that provides “computer systems with the ability to “learn” (i.e. 
progressively improve performance on a specific task) with data, without being explicitly 
programmed (Wikipedia). It pertains to how	does	a	system	learns	using	data	(CEB	Insights).	 
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optimally support, encourage, and address an organization’s employees is a characteristic of “AI 
leaders.” Focusing on generation as opposed to adoption of machine learning would enable 
researchers to have greater access to data and information. In addition, organizational investment 
in AI, specifically machine learning is estimated to double over the next three years; it is 
estimated that sixty-four percent of organizations will have adopted machine learning by 202096.  
Through the course of my research for my thesis, “early AI adopters” were identified as 
organizations that are heavily investing in analytics expertise (CIO)97; in this way, selecting a 
specific method of analytics and evaluating organizations that have integrated machine learning 
into a type of analytics will narrow one’s research focus, as well as pinpoint a function within an 
organization that is intended to address people within an organization.  
Investigating organizations that are implementing people analytics efforts is an 
intentional effort to further evaluate how organizations are adopting strategies to address their 
employees. As I concluded in my thesis, national cultural values do differ, organizational culture 
influences AI adoption, and organizational cultural values can influence individual values. HR 
Analytics or People Analytics refers to a type of analytics that is aimed to aid managers and 
employees make decisions about their workforce. It applies statistics, technology and data. 
Organizations utilize HR analytics to optimize management practices, forecasting attrition, and 
                                                
96 The International Data Corporation(IDC) forecasts that spending on AI and machine learning 
will grow from $8 billion in 2016 to $47 billion in 2020. 
97 It is estimated that “AI leaders” have been able to “digitally transform” and digital 
transformation is a cornerstone of machine learning adoption. 72% of CIOs have responsibility 
for digital transformation initiatives that drive machine learning adoption. The survey found that 
the greater the level of digital transformation success, the more likely machine learning-based 
programs and strategies would succeed. IDC predicts that 40% of digital transformation 
initiatives will be supported by machine learning and artificial intelligence by 2019 (CIO). In 
addition, it is forecasted that a majority executives are planning to use machine learning in their 
organizations today (CIO).  
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employee training by analyzing trends in talent data. Though HR has been slower to integrate AI 
in comparison to marketing and sales, a greater number of organizations are beginning to 
integrate machine learning and leveraging these types of algorithms to predict attrition, and to 
identify ways to guide and manage employees (TechCrunch). The primary goals of people 
analytics are the following: to help organizations to make smarter, more strategic and more 
informed talent decisions; in this way, organizations can find better applicants, make smarter 
hiring decisions, and increase employee performance and retention(TechCrunch).  
There is a reason that “everyone is into HR analytics right now” (CEB); in a world of 
“tectonic” technological change, organizations are prioritizing investment in strategies relating to 
talent acquisition, talent management, and talent retention.98 Talent is becoming the most 
important resource because there is scarcity of people who have the specific skills needed in 
today’s world.99 For this reason, exploring and evaluating organizations that are implementing 
machine learning for HR analytics would provide interesting insight on how organizations are 
navigating employee management, given different cultural values of people. In addition, the 
purpose of using machine learning in HR analytics is to integrate a software system that “learns” 
over time about its employees. This type of system may facilitate organizations to identify and 
address employees based on their cultural values, motivations, and personalities. Where I had 
                                                
98 Power to the New People Analytics, by Bruce Fecheyr-Lippens, Bill Schaninger, and Karen 
Tanner, indicated that “the latest data nd analytics buzz comes from the field of HR analytics, 
where the application of new techniques and new thinking to talent management is becoming 
more mainstream.” 
99 According to from an interview conducted by CEB, Guru Sethupathy mentions that “there is a 
scarcity of people who can do, deal with new technologies, learn the skills, upgrade their skills, 
and change” (CEB). He mentions that companies are vying to attract a small group of individuals 
who “sit at the intersection of having business knowledge, analytical knowledge, and then the 
growth mindset” (CEB). 
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previously assumed that cultural values were fixed and might predispose certain individuals, and 
thereby organizations to being more able to integrate AI, the combination of people analytics and 
machine learning, might facilitate organizational adaptability regardless of an organizations 
country of origin, and the national cultural values associated with that nation.  
Research Question: Is orienting investment towards machine learning for HR analytics a 
viable strategy for organizations to integrate technology into organizational processes? 
2. A Case Study Evaluating Organizations Characterized as “AI Leaders”  
Since “early AI adopters” include organizations that are generating and adopting AI 
technology, one area for future research would be to evaluate more specifically the ratio of AI 
generation versus adoption. Google, Amazon, and various others, are characterized as “leading 
the race for AI” (The Economist); distinguishing between the innovation processes that these 
organizations have used would be beneficial, as it would enable more specific insight to be 
gathered. For example, evaluating the budget that Google has allocated for AI, and then 
distinguishing between its AI adoption costs (acquiring startups, strategic partnerships, etc.) and 
its AI generation costs (R&D investment, research grants, etc.) would afford insight regarding 
how Google has attained its status as an AI leader. In addition, more specificity with regards to 
Google’s (or any organization’s) AI adoption and generation expenditures will enable more 
detailed analyses about the factors influencing organizational adoption or generation of AI. It is 
difficult to learn or establish “best practices” if information about the strategies that AI leaders 
have utilized reference a term that includes adoption and generation, as these strategies are 
distinct and require different organizational approaches. Once a common definition exists, 
insight can be more specifically evaluated.  
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Research Question: Is a viable strategy for organizations to integrate technology into 
organizational processes to generate and adopt technology at a specific ratio?  
3. Optimally Evaluating Organizational Adoption of AI  
One of the primary contributions of this thesis was the optimal approach that I identified 
to comparatively quantify the rate of organizational adoption of AI. This approach is defined and 
thoroughly explained in the Chapter 4 of the thesis. In my opinion, executing this alternative 
methodological approach is a lower priority, relative to the two other areas of research that were 
explained above. I believe this because my goal is to provide insight to the overarching question 
that motivated this thesis in the first place. In addition, I believe that the first opportunity of 
future research (explained above) incorporates components of the ideal approach that I identified 
in Chapter 4, and extends it too; in this way, the first approach is the approach to continue to 
offer insight on the overarching question.  
The purpose of research is assessing the current state of a field, identify where gaps exist, 
and contribute to filing these gaps, or provide insight about them. Igor Perisic mentions that, 
“research is conducted for the benefit of by others is intended to be continued, and leveraged by 
others” (Microsoft Research); in this way, I was eager to contribute to the field, and to point my 
fellow researchers in the direction that, in my opinion, is of greatest priority.  
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APPENDIX A: DIAGRAMS TO ACCOMPANY THESIS CHAPTERS 
Figures to Accompany Chapter Two 
 
 
Figures to Accompany Chapter Three 
 
95	
	
Table 2: Figure to Accompany Chapter Five 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL REFLECTION 
Origin of the Motivation for this Thesis 
 
Insight articulated by Robert Pirsig catalyzed my examination of the interconnectedness 
of technology and values. This exploration led me down an incredible path or being stuck and 
unstuck (also coined by Mr. Pirsig).  
 
“The way to solve the conflict between human values and technological needs is not to 
run away from technology. That’s impossible. The way to resolve the conflict is to break down 
the barriers of dualistic thoughts that prevent a real understanding of what technology is—not an 
exploitation of nature, but a fusion of nature and the human spirit into a new kind of creation that 
transcends both. When transcendence occurs in such events as the first airplane flight across the 
ocean or the first footstep on the moon, a kind of public recognition of the transcendent nature of 
technology occurs. But this transcendence should also occur at the individual level, on a personal 
basis, in one’s own life, in a less dramatic way.” 
 
What is “being stuck” and “stuckness”?  
 
The difference between a good mechanic and a bad one, like the difference between a 
good mathematician and a bad one, is precisely this ability to select the good facts from the bad 
ones on the basis of quality. He has to care! This is an ability about which formal traditional 
scientific method has nothing to say. It's long past time to take a closer look at this qualitative 
preselection of facts which has seemed so scrupulously ignored by those who make so much of 
these facts after they are "observed." I think that it will be found that a formal acknowledgment 
of the role of Quality in the scientific process doesn't destroy the empirical vision at all. It 
expands it, strengthens it and brings it far closer to actual scientific practice. 
 
I think the basic fault that underlies the problem of stuckness is traditional rationality's 
insistence upon "objectivity," a doctrine that there is a divided reality of subject and object. For 
true science to take place these must be rigidly separate from each other. "You are the mechanic. 
There is the motorcycle. You are forever apart from one another. You do this to it. You do that to 
it. These will be the results." 
 
This eternally dualistic subject-object way of approaching the motorcycle sounds right to 
us because we're used to it. But it's not right. It's always been an artificial interpretation 
superimposed on reality. It's never been reality itself. When this duality is completely accepted a 
certain nondivided relationship between the mechanic and motorcycle, a craftsmanlike feeling 
for the work, is destroyed. When traditional rationality divides the world into subjects and 
objects it shuts out Quality, and when you're really stuck it's Quality, not any subjects or objects, 
that tells you where you ought to go. 
 
By returning our attention to Quality it is hoped that we can get technological work out of 
the noncaring subject-object dualism and back into craftsmanlike self-involved reality again, 
which will reveal to us the facts we need when we are stuck. 
Let's consider a reevaluation of the situation in which we assume that the stuckness now 
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occurring, the zero of consciousness, isn't the worst of all possible situations, but the best 
possible situation you could be in. After all, it's exactly this stuckness that Zen Buddhists go to 
so much trouble to induce; through koans, deep breathing, sitting still and the like. Your mind is 
empty, you have a "hollow-flexible" attitude of "beginner's mind." You're right at the front end 
of the train of knowledge, at the track of reality itself. Consider, for a change, that this is a 
moment to be not feared but cultivated. If your mind is truly, profoundly stuck, then you may be 
much better off than when it was loaded with ideas. 
 
The solution to the problem often at first seems unimportant or undesirable, but the state 
of stuckness allows it, in time, to assume it’s true importance. It seemed small because your 
previous rigid evaluation which led to the stuckness made it small. 
 
But now consider the fact that no matter how hard you try to hang on to it, this stuckness 
is bound to disappear. Your mind will naturally and freely move toward a solution. Unless you 
are a real master at staying stuck you can't prevent this. The fear of stuckness is needless because 
the longer you stay stuck the more you see the Quality...reality that gets you unstuck every time. 
What's really been getting you stuck is the running from the stuckness through the cars of your 
train of knowledge looking for a solution that is out in front of the train. 
 
Stuckness shouldn't be avoided. It's the psychic predecessor of all real understanding. An 
egoless acceptance of stuckness is a key to an understanding of all Quality, in mechanical work 
as in other endeavors. It's this understanding of Quality as revealed by stuckness which so often 
makes self-taught mechanics so superior to institute-trained men who have learned how to 
handle everything except a new situation. 
 
Normally screws are so cheap and small and simple you think of them as unimportant. 
But now, as your Quality awareness becomes stronger, you realize that this one, individual, 
particular screw is neither cheap nor small nor unimportant. Right now this screw is worth 
exactly the selling price of the whole motorcycle, because the motorcycle is actually valueless 
until you get the screw out. With this reevaluation of the screw comes a willingness to expand 
your knowledge of it. 
 
-Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values 
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